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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIA..'-1 AlJDREivS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
LMiTRENCE MORRIS, as Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16168 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant petitioned for a post-conviction writ 
of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court to 
which respondent moved to dismiss. The Honorable James s. 
Sawaya granted respondent's motion and dismissed the 
petition with prejudice. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below heard oral arguments on the 
respondent's motion to dismiss and thereafter granted the 
motion on November 30, 1978, and also denied appellant's 
motion for a stay of execution. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments 
and order of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 15, 1974, appellant was found guilty 
by a jury of three counts of murder in the first degree 
and two counts of aggravated robbery. The gruesome facts 
surrounding the crimes were previously recited to this Court 
on appellant's and his co-defendant's direct appeals in 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); and State v. 
Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977). See also the Statement 
of Facts in the State of Utah's brief in opposition to 
appellant's petition for certiorari in Andrews v. State, 
United States Supreme Court No. 77-6743, cert. denied 
October 2, 1978, which is part of the record on appeal in 
the instant case. 
After a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury 
determined that appellant's case was a proper case for the 
imposition of the death penalty, and appellant was 
sentenced to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant and his co-defendant took direct appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court raising constitutional challenges to 
their convictions and sentences. This Court subsequently 
affirmed the convictions and sentences in State v. Pierre, 
-2-
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supra, and State v. Andrews, supra. Motions for a rehearing 
of the appeals were made by appellant and his co-defendant 
without supporting authorities, and these motions were 
subsequently denied by this Court. 
On or about April 20, 1978, appellant petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari and 
the State filed a brief in opposition to his petition. 
(These pleadings were made part of the proceedings before 
Judge Sawaya and are also part of the record on appeal in 
the instant case.) On October 2, 1978, the petition for 
writ of certiorari was denied by the high court. 
On or about November 15, 1978, appellart f-1ed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial 
District Court, and also applied for a stay of his execution 
which was then set for Dece~er 7, 1978. Again, he raised 
numerous constitutional challenges to his conviction and 
sentence. Significantly, in his petition, appellant also 
sought an order from the court granting him authority to 
obtain subpoenas in forma pauperis for witnesses and 
documents necessary to prove the facts alleged in his 
petition and for an additional sixty days after the 
completion of any hearing on his petition to brief the 
issues of law raised in his petition. The clear implication 
-3-
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of these requests is that petitioner had neither ascertained 
the facts nor the controlling law to support his legal claims 
when he filed his petition despite the fact that he had had 
approximately one year to do so from the date his conviction 
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, respondent filed a motion to dismiss 
the petition on November 24, 1978, alleging that (1) 
petitioner could not, by writ of habeas corpus, raise issues 
that were or could have been raised in his direct appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court; (2) prosecutorial discretion in 
charging a capital felony is permissible under recent rulings 
of the United States Supreme Court; and (3) all issues 
raised by petitioner were addressed in prior pleadings sub-
mitted by the State in prior proceedings and adequately 
dispose of petitioner's issues on the merits. (Such pleadings 
were annexed to respondent's motion to dismiss.) 
On or about November 28, 1978, appellant filed an 
amended petition with the Third District Court, again raising 
constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence. 
Again, petitioner sought an order from the court for adequate 
time for briefing, discovery and preparation for any hearing 
on his claims and for sufficient authority to obtain subpoenas 
in forma pauperis for witness~s and documents necessary to 
prove the facts alleged in hih petition. 
-4-
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Respondent, forthwith, filed a motion to dismiss 
appellant's amended petition on November 29, 1978, reasserting 
the arguments raised in the prior motion to dismiss, but 
adding additional arguments that certain claims in the amended 
petition could be dismissed as a matter of lav7 and others 
were frivolous. 
Respondent's motion to dismiss and appellant's 
application for a stay of execution came on for hearing on 
November 30, 1978. Appellant expressed no objection to the 
hearing proceeding on November 30th (Hearing Transcript of 
November 30, 1978, at 3, 5). After full argument, Judge 
Sawaya commented from the bench that he hac revie''''=d the 
Utah Supreme Court's rulings on appellant's ancL >,~s :::o-
defendant's direct appeals, and said, " ••• it seems to me 
that it [the cases) covers nearly every issue that could 
possibly be raised in a capital case except the one ••• 
on the question of whether or not the death sentence is 
being imposed in a fair manner." (Hearing Transcript of 
November 30, 1978, at 32.) However, on that latter issue, 
Judge Sawaya commented as follows: 
One thing that disturbs me is the fact 
that, regardless of our feeling about capital 
punishment, it seems that what you [appellants] 
are urging is that in any situation where an 
individual is convicted and sentenced to death 
I guess we should wait over a few years period and 
see whether or not there are others that are so 
-5-
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convicted and sentenced and then if it is 
not being imposed on an equal pattern then the 
man should have a stay and should have a new 
trial or something. I'm not sure I buy that 
theory but I'm willing to give it some considera-
tion. I'm not sure that I have a right to even 
voice an opinion about it. The question is 
whether or not there is a new issue that should 
be considered and the only one that I can see is 
the one involving prosecutorial discretion as 
it affects the imposition of the death penalty so 
I'll consider it and I'll have you a ruling 
probably about noon today. (T.32). 
It should be noted that earlier in the hearing, respondent 
referred the court to his legal analysis of the issue of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging capital offenses 
contained at pages six and seven of his memorandum in support 
of his motion to dismiss, and argued that the issue was one 
that could be disposed of as a matter of law because the 
claim had previously been raised to and rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in prior capital cases (T.26). 
Later on November 30, 1978, Judge Sawaya issued 
a memorandum decision granting respondent's motion to dismiss 
and concluding as follows: 
It is the opoinion of the Court that the 
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 
herein raises no issue of fact or law material 
to determination of the legality and consti-
tutionality of the conviction, confinement 
or sentence of the Petitioner which were not 
raised or could not have been raised on appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. (R.ll8). 
He also signed an order on November 30, 1978, granting 
respondent's motion which read as follows: 
-6-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent's 
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus is granted on the 
ground that all issues raised in petitioner's 
petition were known or should have been known 
at the time petitioner took his direct appeal 
from his conviction to the Utah Supreme Court, 
and all issues either were raised or could have 
been raised on that appeal, and habeas corpus 
may not be used to relitigate appealed issues 
or to raise issues which could have been raised 
on appeal. Maguire v. Smith, 547 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1976); Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 (Utah 1976); 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1968); and Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 
431 P.2d 121 (1967). Accordingly, petitioner's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed 
with prejudice, and petitioner's application for 
a stay of execution is denied. (R.ll9-l20). 
Finally, on December 4, 1978, Judge SaHaya entered 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of la~: 
1. No developments of fact or law material 
to the determination of the legality and 
constitutionality of the conviction and sentence 
of the Petitioner herein have occurred since the 
filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court and that Court's decision on that 
appeal. 
2. All the issues regarding the constitutionality 
of the processes for death sentences under Utah law, 
the constitutionality of the death sentence in 
Petitioner's case, and the effect of any alleged 
prejudicial publicity or influences on Petitioner's 
trial which are raised or could have been raised 
by this Petition are the same issues that Petitioner 
raised in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah's death penalty law 
is being applied arbitrarily and discrirninatorily fails 
to state a claim on which relief could be granted or 
on which a hearing need be held. Moreover, petitioner 
could and should have raised such issue on direct appeal. 
4. Constitutional issues identical to those raised 
-7-
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appeal. 
and decided on direct appeal cannot be raised 
again in collateral proceedings. 
5. Constitutional challenges to the 
pattern of application of a criminal statute 
or the excessiveness of a criminal sentence 
which were not but could have been raised 
on direct appeal cannot be raised through 
collateral proceedings. (R.l24-125). 
From the above rulings, appellant now brings this 
-8-
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POINT I 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN UTAH IS 
PROPERLY LIMITED BY JUDICIAL INTERPRETA-
TION TO EXCLUDE ISSUES THAT COULD OR 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
A 
A STATE MAY FREELY RESTRICT THE 
AVAILABILITY OF A POST-CONVICTION 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
In Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946), the 
United States Supreme Court examined the requirements of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to 
a state prisoner's claim of denial of his right to assistance 
of counsel. The court found that the due process clause 
did not impose uniform standards upon the states Wlth respect 
to procedural details in their individual systems of criminal 
justice. The Court stated further: 
~'lide discretion must be left to the 
States for the manner of adjudicating a 
claim that a conviction is unconstitutional. 
States are free to devise their own systems 
of review in criminal cases. A State may 
decide whether to have direct appeals in 
such cases, and if so under ~trhat circumstances. 
. . • In respecting the duty laid upon them 
by Mooney v. Holohan, States have a wide 
choice of remedies. A State may provide that 
the protection of rights granted by the Federal 
Constitution be sought through the writ of 
habeas corpus or coram nobis. It may use each 
of these ancient writs in its common law scope, 
or it may put them to new uses; or it may afford 
remedy by a simple motion brought either in the 
court of original conviction or at the place of 
detention< 0 So long as the rights under the 
-9-
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United States Constitution ~ay be pursued, 
it is for a State and not for this Court to 
define the mode by which they ~ay be 
vindicated. (Citations omitted.) 
329 u.s. at 175-76. 
This philosophy was reaffirmed in Young v. Ragen, 337 u.s. 
235 (1949), wherein it was emphasized that "Illinois may 
choose the procedure it deems appropriate for the vindication 
of federal rights." Id. at 238. The most revealing statement 
of the deference afforded states in fashioning post-conviction 
remedies is found in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion 
in Brown v. Allen, 344 u.s. 443 (1953): 
The states all allow some appeal from 
a judgment of conviction which permits review 
of any question of law, state or federal, 
raised upon the record. No state is obliged 
to furnish multiple remedies for the same 
grievance. Most states, and with good reason, 
will not suffer a collateral attack such as 
habeas corpus to be used as a substitute for 
or dupl1cation of the appeal. A state properly 
may deny habeas corpus to raise either state or 
federal issues that were or could have been 
ra1sed on appeal. Such restriction by the 
state should be respected by federal courts. 
(Emphasis added.) 
344 U.S. at 541. 
The reference to "issues that were or could have been raised 
on appeal" is virtually identical to the language used by this 
Court and the lower courts in the Utah cases as discussed ~· 
In Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942), an indi-
vidual convicted of murder sought a writ of coram nobis from 
the Supreme Court of Florida which had affirmed his conviction 
-10-
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on direct appeal three years earlier. The Florida Supreme 
Court refused to grant the petition. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether 
due process had been denied the petitioner because of the 
alleged use of perjured testimony by the prosecution at 
trial. In affirming the denial of the writ, the Court 
found that Florida's post-conviction process met the 
requirements of due process. (It is significant to note 
that Florida, like Utah in Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requires that the petitioner assert and show a 
"substantial denial" of a claimed constitutional right.) 
The United States Supreme Court decried what ~t ·~~~T:~ed 
as an "unedifying story in the administration of criminal 
justice" and "leaden-footed, dilatory procedure." The clear 
import of the decision in Hysler \>las that the Court would 
not questionthe particular details of a state post-conviction 
procedure where a remedy, such as coram nobis or habeas corpus, 
was sought after an individual had been properly tried, 
convicted and denied relief by the highest court of the state 
on direct appeal. Because the collateral attack on the 
conviction was instituted some three years after the judgment 
was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida was 
encouraged to exercise "the vigilance of a hard-headed 
consideration of appeals to it for upsetting a conviction." 
Id. at 422. 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent submits that just this type of vigilance 
has repeatedly and properly been exercised by this Court in 
scrutinizing post-conviction petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus in Utah. Vigilance is particuarly appropriate in 
the instant case where petitioner has appealed his conviction 
unsuccessfully to this Court, petitioned for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court without success, and finally, 
some four years after his conviction, sought collateral relief 
in state court. 
Appellant is candid in admitting that the United 
States Supreme Court in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), 
did not decide that the Fourteenth Amendment required any 
particular post-conviction criminal process. The Court 
merely stated that post-conviction remedies were "desirable." 
Id. at 346. Moreover, the Supreme Court continues to remain 
steadfast in its position that a state need not even provide 
for direct appeal of criminal convictions. Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600 (1974). The United States Supreme Court's 
unwillingness to require states to provide post-conviction 
remedies expressed in Case continues to be the dominant 
rationale. The Supreme Court recently stated "It does not 
follow, however, that this Court has the power to compel a 
State to employ a collateral post-conviction remedy in 
which specific fw1Pr'IJ claims may be raised." Huffman v. 
Florida, No. 77-6025, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1014, 1017 
-12-
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(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Case v. Nebraska, 
supra). The concluding paragraph of Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion in Case makes it clear: 
[T]here is no occasion in this case 
to decide whether due process requires 
the States to provide corrective process. 
The new statute [the Nebraska statute 
providing for post conviction relief] 
on its face is plainly an adequate 
corrective process. Every consideration 
of federalism supports our conclusion to 
afford the Nebraska courts the opportunity 
to say whether that process is available 
for the hearing and determination of 
petitioner's claim. 
381 U.S. at 347. 
Utah also allows an individual to attack his convict:ion by 
means of a motion in arrest of judgment (Utah Code Ann. § 
77-34-1 (1953), motion for new trial (Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38-l (1953), and the various common law writs of coram 
nobis, mandamus and prohibition. In short, respondent 
maintains that Utah has more than adequately provided for 
the protection of a prisoner's rights, in the spirit of Case 
v. Nebraska, even thoughthe state is not required to do so 
by the federal constitution. 
It is clear, then, that Utah is free to provide 
any system of post-conviction criminal process that it deems 
appropriate. State post-conviction writs of habeas corpus 
-13-
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are not mandated by the federal Constitution. Many other 
states have adopted a policy in post-conviction habeas 
corpus cases that is very similar to Utah's. A reprcsenta-
tive cross-section of the jurisdictions includes Alabama, 
Arizona, California, Maine, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, 
. d h' 1 Pennsylvan1a an Was 1ngton. Each of these states prevents 
a habeas corpus petitioner from raising issues that could 
have been raised on appeal. The support lent to Utah's 
position by the adoption of this policy by other states 
evidences the viability of Utah's decision to limit the 
scope of post-conviction writs of habeas corpus. Once 
a state has chosen to enact provisions entitling a prisoner 
to post-conviction relief, as Utah has done with Rule 65B(i), 1t 
1 See, e.g., Greer v. State, 49 Ala.Aop. 36, 268 So.2d 
502 (1972); Griswold v. Gomes, 111 Ariz. 59, 523 P.2d 
590 (1974); In re Black, 59 Cal.Rptr. 429, 428 P.2d 
293 (1967); Boyd v. State, 282 A.2d 169 (Maine 1971); 
Junior v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 532 P.2d 1037 / 
(Nev. 1975); People ex rel. White v. LaVallee, 367 N.Y.S.~ 
122 (N.Y.A.D. 1975); Young v. State, 451 P.2d 971 (Okla. I 
Cr. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel DeMoss v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 
597, 225 A. 2d 673 (1967); Koehn v. Pinnock, 80 \·lash. 2d 
338, 494 P.2d 987 (1972). 
-14-
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need only apply such a remedy in a fashion that comports with 
notions of federal due process. Respondent maintains that 
the following discussion will sustain a finding that this 
Court's record in handling post-conviction writs of habeas 
corpus does in fact meet the requirements of due process. 
B 
THIS COURT IS EMPOWERED "liTH DISCRETION 
TO LIMIT THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF 
RULE 65B(i), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953), reads: 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by 
rules, for all courts of the State of Utah, 
the forms of process, writs, pleadings and 
motions and the practice and procedure· in all 
civil and criminal actions and procceJings, 
including rules of evidence therein, and also 
divorce, probate and guardianship proceedings. 
Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify 
the substantive rights of any litigant. Upon 
promulgation the Supreme Court shall fix the 
date when such rules shall take effect and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith 
providing for procedure in courts only shall 
be of no further force and effect. Nothing 
in this title, anything therein to the contrary 
notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, super-
sede or repeal any such rules heretofore 
prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
In 1969 this Court exercised this rule-making power 
by approving Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, providing 
for extraordinary writs. Specifically, Rule 65B(i) (1) states: 
(l) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a commitment of any court, 
whether such imprisonment be under an original 
co~~itment or under a commitment for violation of 
probation or parole, who asserts that in any 
-15- J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceedings which resulted in his commitment 
tl•ere was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United States 
or of the State of Utah, or both, may institute 
a proceeding under this Rule. 
The authorization of the post-conviction use of the writ of 
habeas corpus is consistent with what scholars have concluded 
is a valid legislative power to limit, enlarge or amend the 
so-called "Great Writ." See: Collings, Habeas Corpus for 
Convicts--Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 
Calif. L. Rev. 335 (1952); Oakes, Legal History in the High 
Court--Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1965). The statu~cy 
authorization in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953), is, then, a 
valid delegation by the legislature to this Court of its 
power to control the writ of habeas corpus. It is respondent's: 
I 
position that given the power to "prescribe, alter and revise" 1 
the writ of habeas corpus by rules, 2 this Court also has,~ prio'~ 
the power to define the scope and application of rule 65B(i). I 
This Court's power is limited only by the provision 
in Section 78-2-4 that states: "Such rules may not abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." 
Respondent has demonstrated that petitioner has no federal 
constitutional right to state habeas corpus relief, thus, 
such a claim could not be included in the phrase "substantive 
right" as contemplated by Section 78-2-4. The state constit~ 
tion, Art. I, Sec. 5, is an almost verbatim adoption of the 
federal suspension clause, Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 2. The 
2 Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953). 
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suspension clause is directed at suspects, not at convicts. 
See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts--Constitutional 
Rights or Legislative Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 340-41 
(1952). Any modifidation of the post-conviction writ of 
habeas corpus does not run afoul of the suspension clause. 
Thus, any limitations imposed by this Court upon the post-
conviction use of the writ cannot deprive petitioner of a 
state constitutional right. Therefore, as applied to state 
post-conviction writs of habeas corpus, Section 78-2-4 pro-
hibits only the abridgement, enlargement or modification of 
the state rights of the litigant. The rights granted 
petitioner under Rule 65B(i) are procedural as well as 
substantive. If, in the adjudication of a clai~ ~nder 
Rule 65B(i), a petitioner is afforded due process, the state 
has met its constitutional and statutory obligations for 
determining a state-created right. 
Respondent will demonst-rate that due process has been 
complied with in the instant case. Having established that 
this Court has the power to control the availability of 
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy, it is necessary 
to establish that the Utah case law limiting the scope 
of Rule 65B(i) is reasonable and in furtherance of a 
legitimate state interest. 
·-1 7-
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c 
THIS COURT HAS PROPERLY LIMITED THE 
POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
TO ITS COMMON LAW PURPOSES BY ENFORCING 
A WAIVER DOCTRINE THAT PROMOTES FINALITY 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
A revie\-7 of the numerous Utah cases involving 
post-conviction writs of habeas corpus reveals that the 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked what is essentially 
a waiver doctrine in regard to recognizable claims. A 
petitioner may not raise claims in a post-conviction petition 
for writ of habeas corpus that could or should have been 
raised on direct appeal. Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 
440 P.2d 968 (1968). This standard is imposed whether an 
appeal is or is not taken. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 
431 P.2d 121 (1967) (no appeal taken); Maguire v. Smith, 
547 P.2d 697 (Utah 1976) (appeal taken). The types of claims 
that are permissible on a post-conviction writ are stated 
in Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977): 
[T]he writ has its purposes, including 
the providing of a remedy where it challenges 
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the 
judgment, or where the sentence imposed is one 
not authorized by law, or where it is of an 
entirely different character than that which 
the statute prescribes, so that a person is 
being held under an obviously illegal sentence 
and it would thus be unconscionable not to 
examine the issue. 
560 P.2d at 1109. 
-18-
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The scope of the writ described in Rammell is 
somewhat broader than the common law grounds stated in 
Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910): "Upon habeas 
corpus the court examines only the power and authority of 
the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions." 
Id. at 448. If a state may restrict the scope of habeas 
corpus to its common law limits, a practice approved in 
Carter v. Illinois, supra, then it follows that Utah 
may permissibly expand the common law limits to the standard 
set forth in Rammell. Respondent would emphasize that Utah 
has properly limited the scope of post-conviction habeas 
corpus to issues involving (1) the jurisdiction of the trial 
court; (2) the validity of the sentence; or (3) "obvious 
illegality." Rammell, supra at 1109. The essential 
constitutional soundness of Utah's post-conviction writ of 
habeas corpus should not be obscured by the extensive 
argument in the instant case concerning the waiver doctrine. 
An analysis of the habeas waiver doctrine in this 
case has been muddled by appellant's interjection of elements 
of collateral estoppel and res judicata. It is necessary to 
clear up any confusion by examining the exact nature of the 
concepts of waiver, collateral estoppel and res judicata. 
Initially, it must be understood that res judicata 
has generally been held to be inapplicable in the area of 
habeas corpus. Fay v. Noia, 372 li.S. 391 (1963). The writ 
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lies to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless thut 
imprisonment pursuant to them is void, not merely erroneous, 
so the application of res judicata would contravene the very 
nature of the writ. 
Collateral estoppel and waiver are distinguished 
in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., at 650: "Waiver 
is voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right, 
benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert it." 
A party is generally precluded from relitigating an issue 
that has been decided adversely to him in a prior proceeding. 
In retrospectively examining the rights of a habeas corpus 
petitioner, this Court has not found the prisoner estopped 
from raising issues that could have been raised on appeal but 
were not. In that case, there has been no adverse decision 
on the issue. Rather, the position of this Court has been 
that a petitioner is found to have waived claims that could 
have been raised on appeal but were not. As stated above, 
a waiver typically involves an element of intent or knowledge 
of the giving up of the right. This Court has deemed claims 
that could have been raised on direct appeal as being within 
the knowledge of petitioner, supporting the finding of waiver. 
When the state has created the right of direct appeal of a 
criminal conviction, it is not unreasonable to enforce a 
waiver doctrine with respect to another state-created right, 
habeas corpus. Thus, respondent contends that Utah courts 
are utilizing a waiver theory, not collateral estoppel, and 
-20-
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that the waiver is being reasonably applied in post-
conviction cases. 
Appellant cites Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963), as setting forth the proper guidelines for 
determining whether a petitioner has waived issues that 
he is attempting to raise in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. Several cases decided after Fay by the 
United States Supreme Court have severely undercut Fay's 
"deliberate waiver" doctrine and have left the test of 
waived issues in an uncertain state. 
The most significant recent habeas corpus case 
decided by the United States Supreme Court is Wa~~~right 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Wainwright, petitloner 
Sykes was convicted of third degree murder in a Florida 
circuit court. At trial, testimony was admitted that 
allegedly violated Sykes' rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 u.s. 436 (1966). However, no objection to the evidence 
was made at trial, as required by Florida's contemporaneous 
objection rule. 3 Sykes ''apparently" did not raise the 
Miranda issue on direct appeal of his conviction. 433 u.s. 
at 75. Sykes subsequently filed three unsuccessful post-
conviction petitions in Florida state courts which raised 
the Miranda issue for the first time. 
3 Florida Rule Crim. Proco 3.190(i), cited in 433 U.S. 
71, n. 5. 
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Sykes then sought habeas corpus relief in federal 
district court, where he raised the Miranda issue again. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida ruled, inter alia, that Sykes had not lost his 
right to raise the issue by failing to object at trial or 
on direct appeal. The court reasoned that only "exceptional 
circumstances" of "strategic decisions at trial" would effect 
a waiver of issues in later habeas corpus actions. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the "deliberate 
bypass"rule in Fay v. Noia. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), 
and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 {1976), as limiting 
Fay v. Noia, and concluding that a failure to comply with 
procedural requirements would bar the raising of those issues 
for the first time on federal habeas corpus absent a showing 
of cause for the noncompliance and prejudice resulting from 
the state procedural waiver. The precise definition of the 
"cause" and "prejudice" standard was explicitly left open for 
future decisions, the court noting: 
[o]nly that it is narrower than 
th~ standard set forth in dicta in ~-
Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which would make 
federal habeas review generally available to 
state convicts absent a knowing and deliberate 
waiver of the federal constitutional contention. 
It.is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, 
go1ng far beyond the facts of the case eliciting 
it, which we today reject. 
433 U.S. at 87-88. 
-22-
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The Court lists its reasons for narrowing the 
"deliberate bypass'' standard as including the valid 
function of the state procedural requirement itself, the 
contribution to finality in criminal litigation, the 
prevention of "sand-bagging'' on the part of defense 
lawyers and the desire to make the state trial the "main 
event." Id. at 88-90. Appellant concedes the legitimacy 
of the deliberate bypass rule and finality in the criminal 
justice system at page 8 of his brief, where he states: 
This does not mean that a prisoner may 
relitigate through post conviction proceedings 
the self same issues decided against him in 
his direct appeal, or that criminal defendants 
may bypass issues in appealing their convictions 
and hold them in reserv~ for post convicticn 
proceedings. 
While Wainwright deals \11th a federaJ habeas 
corpus case, respondent submits that the court's statements 
concerning waiver of issues are applicable to the instant 
case in particular and Utah habe~'' corpus proceedings in 
general. 
Wainwright v. Sykes was applied in the manner urged 
by respondent in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied u.s. (March 26, 1979). 
Petitioner Spenkelink (spelled "Sp1nkellink" by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) failed to raise a claim of 
improper jury selection to the FJ.c,rlda Supreme Court on appeal 
of his 1973 conviction for firs~ degree jurder. (Spenkelink 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Instit te of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was sentenced to death as a result of the conviction.) 
Spenkelink's arguments in his petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief were largely based upon United States Supreme 
Court cases decided after his appeal had been taken, an 
obvious similarity to the instant case. Despite Spenkelink's 
arguments, the Fifth Circuit clearly indicated that Wainwright 
v. Sykes would seem to preclude the raising of issues waived 
in a state proceeding. (The Florida Supreme Court had held the 
claim waived in Spenkelink v. State, 350 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1977).) 
The Fifth Circuit proceeded to discuss Spenkelink's claims 
as a matter of law, but the citation of Hainwright v. Sykes 
is a clear indication of Wainwright's broad applicability, 
extending even to a death penalty case. 
The state procedural ground at issue in the instant 
case is the failure to raise certain issues on direct appeal 
from the conviction. As with the Florida contemporaneous 
objection rule in Wainwright, strict adherence to the Utah 
habeas corpus waiver doctrine furthers several letitimate 
state interests. (See: Henrv v. MississipPi, 379 U.S. 443 
(1965).) The refusal to hear issues on habeas corpus petitions 
that could or should have been raised on direct appeal (1) 
furthers finality in the criminal justice system, (2) prevents 
"sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers, (3) serves to 
make the direct appeal more of a "main event." These saP1c' 
considerations were persuasive to the Hainwright Court. 
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Re~pondent urges this Court to consider these factors in 
addition to the freedom of this state to fashion its own 
remedy, argued above, and find Utah's habeas corpus waiver 
doctrine a valid policy in furtherance of a legitimate 
state interest. 
D 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO I!EET 
HIS BURDEN OF SHO\VING THfl.T THE 
INSTAN'f' PETITION INVOLVES SUCH 
UIJFAIRNESS 7HAT IT l·JOULD BE 
UNCONSCIONABLE ~JOT TO EXA!HNE 
THE CLAH1S RAISED. 
In his concurring opinion in l'Tainwright v. Sykes, 
supra, Justice White states, "I do agree that it is the 
burden of the habeas corpus petitioner to negative deliberate 
bypass and explain his failure to object." Id. at 99. Extend-
ing this statement to the instant case, respondent submits that 
appellant has the burden of showing why relief should be granted 
in the instant case. That is, he must show why the issues 
raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus could not 
have been raised on appeal. Appellant has failed to make such 
a sho'.·ling. 
Appellant raised the following claims in his Third 
District Court petition: (the paragraph numbers refer to the 
actual numbers of his petition below which is part of the 
record before this Court). 
-25-
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llA. predisposition of jury and failure of trial 
judge to grant various motions. 
12. unconstitutionality of death sentence for 
various reasons. 
12A. sentencing statute permits arbitrary 
and discretionary imposition of death penalty; inade~uate 
guidelines for sentencing authority. 
12A(l). unguided and unfettered discretion in 
sentencing authority. 
12A(l) (a). jury in determining sentence needed 
no other facts than those brought out in guilt phase. 
12A(l) (b). jury was required to state only one 
of two possible sentences. 
12A(2). no requirement of finding or pleading 
of aggravating circumstance. 
12A(2) (a). state not required to plead 
aggravating circumstance. 
12A(2) (h). no instruction to jury of unanimity. 
l2A(2) (c). jury not re~uired to specify which 
aggravating circu~stance it relied on. 
12A(3). consideration of unspecified aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. 
12A(3) (a). evidence of irrelevant past miscondnct 
admitted. 
12A(3)(h). jury not required to specify its 
finding on mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstance 
-26-
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12A{3) (c). trial court description of alternate 
sentences. 
12A(3) (d). prosecutor's urging of death penalty. 
12A(4). absence of standards for balancing 
aggravating and mitigating factors. 
12A(4) {a). jury not given standards for 
weighing factors. 
12A(4) (b). jury not required to specify weight 
given to various factors. 
12A(4) (c). inappropriate burden of proof in 
sentencing phase. 
12A(4) (d). jury not informed of burden of proof 
it should look for. 
12A(5). no provision for appellate 01. ·"-"'-c 
review, 
12A{S) {a). appellate review based only on cases 
actually appealed. 
12A (5) (b). failure of this Court to specifically 
review findings of aggravating or nitigating circumstances. 
12A(5) (c). failure of this Court to analyze 
presence of passion or prejudice. 
12A(S) (d). failure of this Court to compare sentences. 
12B. arbitrary and discriminatory pattern and 
practice of imposition of death penalty since 1973. 
12C. no finding that petitioner personally took any 
lives or intended Lo do so. 
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120. purposeless infliction of pain by h,l.nC)ing or 
shooting; infliction of psychological torture. 
The petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding 
has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he 
relies for his release by providing evidence that is 
clear and convincing. McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 
354, 358, 423 P.2d 166, 169 (1967). Appellant has not 
shown any evidence to support the above-enumerated 
claims that even approaches a clear and convincing standard. 
Because such a showing has not been made, appella~t failnd 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Appellant argues that he did not have an opportunity to 
present such evidence. That is not the case. Judge 
Sawaya afforded appellant an opportunity to provide 
support for his claims in the hearing on respondent's 
motion to dismiss. Appellant did not make such a showing 
and thus failed to meet his burden. Moreover, each 
issue was of such a nature that it could properly be 
disposed of as a matter of law. 
Judge Henry J. Friendly in his article, ~ 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 155-156 (1970), has con-
cluded that habeas corpus should not be available upon 
a mere open assertion that a "constitutional" right has 
been denied. Of course, non-constitutional claims that 
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could have been raised on appeal are clearly waived. 
\·7olff v. Rice, 428 U.S. 467 (1976). Appellant's naked 
assertions of "unconscionability" and the "unjustifiable" 
conduct of Judge James S. Sawaya in this case are not 
substantial enough to merit consideration. 
Appellant cites Rammell v. Smith, supra, 
(claim of improper sentence), Horne v. Turner, 29 Utah 
2d 17 5, 506 P. 2d 1268 (197 3), (claim of involunta':_! 
guilty plea), Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 
497 P.2d 34 (1972) (claims of involuntary guilty plea 
and ineffective assistance of counsel), Webster v. Jones, 
587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), (claim of denial of right to 
counsel), to indicate the willingness of thi3 Cou~~ to 
entertain exceptional claims. In each o[ the' 
cases, this Court held that the waiver doctrine applied 
and refused to grant relief in any of the cases. 
Contrary to appellant's assertion at page 9 of his brief, 
the dicta in the cases concerns the instances in which 
the writ will be granted, not the waiver doctrine and the 
error of attemDting to use habeas as a substitute for 
appeal. 
Respondent submits that the claims in the 
instant case do not merit consideration in a writ 
of habeas corpus. If this Court disagrees, it should 
proceed to a determination on the merits of the case 
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immediately. A remand of the case is not warranted as 
requested by appellant. Pursuant to the language in 
Rammell, supra and other cases, this Court will decide 
issues raised in otherwise defective petitions if it so 
chooses. The instant case is one involving protracted 
litigation and a high degree of public concern. The 
interests of justice would best be served by a decision 
from this Court if it should be deter~ined that the 
waiver doctrine is not a bar to appellant's claims. 
Appellant repeatedly protests that he is being 
"forced" into federal court by the operation of Utah's 
habeas corpus waiver doctrine. Respondent submits that 
rather than "forcing" petitioners into federal court 
for a hearing on their claims, Utah is instead properly 
enforcing a waiver ioctrine that is consistent with the 
federal trend announced in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra. 
The waiver doctrine also furthers the legitimate 
(acknowledged as such by appellant) state interests 
in finality and the integrity of the judicial process. 
Utah's waiver doctrine will not cause undue friction 
with the federal courts (resulting from a federal hearing 
on a claim deemed waived by state courts) because 
federal courts, following Wainwright, will lend increasing 
credence to a state court's enforcement of a procedural 
waiver. 
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To sun~arize, respondent contends that Utah, 
as a state, is free to choose whether it will provide 
post-conviction habeas corpus relief. Having chosen to 
doso, this Court is properly empowered to limit the 
scope of habeas corpus as a remedy in any manner that 
it deems is in furtherance of a legitimate state interest. 
The method of limitation chosen is a waiver doctrine 
that limits the v1rit to virtually its common law scope. 
The waiver doctrine is consistent with the trend of 
United States Supreme Court case law that stresses 
finality in the criminal justice system. Under the facts 
of this case, appellant has failed to show why the Utah 
waiver doctrine should not continue to apply and 
fore his claim for post-conviction relief shoulJ 
denied. 
-31-
there-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POIN'r II. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISSS WAS 
PROPERLY GRANTED PURSUANT TO THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S AUTHORITY BASED ON RULES OF 
PROCEDURE, STATUTES AND CASE LA\•7. 
Appellant asserts that post-conviction petitions for 
\·nits of habeas corpus are civil in nature and are governed 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He then argues that 
motions to dismiss such petitions must be made pursuant to 
the appropriate rule, Rule l2(b), and then cites certain 
civil cases (not involving habeas corpus matters) which have 
held that Rule l2(b) motions should not be granted when they 
raise "matters outside the pleadings." He states that if 
matters outside the pleadings are raised, the motion to 
dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment ~nder 
Rule 56. Further, he contends that it is impermissible 
for a court to summarily convert the motion into one for 
summary judgment without first giving the parties the 
opportunity to fully present evidence and contest the 
factual allegations on which the motion is based, and that 
it is error to require the opposing party to state how he 
will establish his claims. Finally, he asserts that Judge 
Sawaya impermissibly granted respondent's motion to dismiss 
because in determining that the Utah waiver doctrine 
(Point I, supra), barred appellant from h~beas corpus reliei, 
the court needed, but did not have, the entire record of prior 
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proceedings before it. Additionally, he claims that he 
raised certain issues in his petition which were not and could 
not have been raised on appeal which were factual in nature, 
and thus which could not be disposed of on the pleadings. 
Respondent contends that appellant has failed to 
recognize the unique natureof habeas corpus proceedings and 
the concomitant rules of procedure which govern such actions. 
Consequently, appellant's arguments distort the actual mechanics 
of Judge Sawaya's granting of the motion to dismiss and attempt 
to apply the doctrine of res judicata \vhere it is wholly 
inapplicable. As shown, supra, in Point I, res judicata 
is generally conceded to be unavailable in habeas corpus. 
Fay v. Noia, supra. The two principles of habeas corpus 
procedure that respondent asserts are applicable arc (~) 
a special, rigid set of rules and burdens of pleading placed 
on a petitioner by Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and (2) the waiver doctrine (not res judicata), discussed 
supra, in Point I. A review of appellant's argumen1:s on this 
point reveals his confusion. 
Initially, appellant's error concerning his 
reliance on res judicata is exhibited by the repeated 
reference to the doctrine throughout Point I. of his brief. 
Appellant states, "A [m) otion cL>iming that one lawsuit should 
be dismissed because it is barred by the decision in 
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another is not a motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
l2(b) but a matter for summary judgment under Rule 56 
since it requires examination of materials and facts beyond 
the pleadings." (Emphasis added) . Brief of appellant at 12. 
The language "barred by the decision in another" clearly 
reflects the underlying concepts of the doctrine of res 
juC:icata. As stated in Green, Basic Civil Procedure, Ch. VIII 
"Res judicata" (1972), at p. 203: "Nevertheless, the 
judgment is conclusive, not because there has been a 
merger, but because the judgment establishes a bar to the 
plaintiff's suit." (Emphasis added) . In the instant case, 
Judge Sawaya did not find that appellant's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus was barred from consideration, rather 
he found that the petition must be dismissed because appellant 
had waived the right to raise the issues that formed the 
substance of the petition without which appellant had failed 
to state a claim. 
Apart from the basic misconception concerning the 
doctrine of res judicata, ap?ellant also misa?plies 
certain characteristics of a motion for summary judgment 
with what respondent initiated as a motion to dismiss in 
Third District Court and what, as evidenced by Judge Sawaya's 
ruling, remained a motion to dismiss. Appellant quot~s 
Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 
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191 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that, "It is error 
to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment without giving the adverse party an opportunity 
to present pertinent material." Brief of appellant at 
12. Respondent asserts that appellant was given an opportunity 
to "presentpertinentmaterial" by submitting it to the court 
in his petition for writ of habeas corpus; indeed, he was 
required to do so by Rule 658 (i) (2). His failure to 
support his petition with pertinent material was a basis for 
the granting of the motion to dismiss. Appellant should not 
be allowed to demand a subsequent opportunity to present 
evidence on a claim that he has failed to state in the first 
place. The court in Soinkellinkv. ~\Tainwright, 578 F.2d 590 
(5th Cir. 1978), U.S. cert denied (March 26, ~; "~· , also 
supports respondent's argument that appellant's opportunity 
to present material evidence of his claims was in his petition 
by stating, "Fourteen months is sufficient time in which to 
assemble evidence for collateral review proceedings." 578 
F.2d 591, n. 11. Apocllant had twelve months in which to 
assemble the evidence for his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the instant case. (November, 1977 to November, 
1978, the date his appeal was decided by this Court to the 
date of the filing of his petition in Third District Court). 
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Appellant next contends that, "It is error for a 
trial court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment or to require the plaintiff to state 
'how he will establish his claim .'",citing several 
non-habeas corpus civil cases in support of this argument 
(Emphasis added). Brief of appellant at 12-13. It is 
Rule 65B(i) which requires the petitioner to state how he 
will establish his claim in his pleading, not the trial 
court. Because Judge Sawaya determined that appellant's 
petition failed to establish a claim, he was merely 
enforcing the requirements of ~ule 65B(i) pursuant to 
respondent's motion to dismiss, not acting in accordance with 
procedure under a motion for summary judgment. Appellant 
concedes that "The kind of dismissal that the District Court 
entered in this case is specifically reserved by the rules of 
civil procedure for pleadings which on their face fail to 
state a cause of action." Brief of appellant at 14. 
Respondent will demonstrate how appellant's petition failed to 
state a claim and additional reasons for appellant's error 
in arguing that a motion for summary judgment Has issued inste.:td 
of a motion to dismiss. 
Respondent agrees that-post-conviction habeas corpus 
is a civil remedy which is generally governed by Utah's 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
388 P.2d 412, 414 (1964). 
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 
However, it must be recognized that 
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unlike a regular civil case (where motions to dismiss or 
motions for summary judgment are asserted at the earliest 
stage of the proceedings often after only an initial complaint 
has been filed commencing the action) , a post-conviction 
habeas corpus action commences after numerous prior court 
proceedings have already occurred where the accused has had 
prior opportunity to raise constitutional challenges to his 
pending or actual incarceration. There has already been 
(1) prior opportunity for pre-trial motions (i.e., suppression 
hearings, challenges to the constitutionality of the 
statute under which the accused is charged, etc); (2) a prior 
conviction where adjudication of facts and law has been made; 
and {3) prior appellate review of the petitioner's case. 
Thus, this Court through its rule-making ac+:!-cc~ity set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953), has the po~er to fashion 
specialized rules governing post-conviction writs of habeas 
corpus. Moreover, as discussed in Point I., supra, this 
Court may, by judicial interpretation, restrict the availability 
of any post-conviction habeas corpus rule (e.g., the waiver 
doctrine) 
This Court has, in fact, enacted a special rule 
governing habeas corpus in Rule 65B(i). That rule, unlike 
rules governing the filing of complaints in routine 
civil cases, additionally requires that the habeas corpus 
complaint (petition) : 
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1. Assert a substantial denial of constitutionJl 
rights; 
2. Identify the proceedings in which the complainant 
was convicted; 
3. Set forth in plain and concise terms the 
factual data constituting each and every manner in which the 
complainant claims that any constitutional rights were 
violated; 
4. Have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting each allegation, or 
shall state why the same arc not attached; 
5. State whether the conviction has been reviewed 
on appeal, and, if so, identify such appellate proceedings 
and state the results thereof; 
6. State whether the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has already been adjudged 
in a prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding. 
Rule 65B(i) (2). 
Thus, habeas corpus complaints must be much more 
comprehensive than those in regular civil cases. The 
petitioner must explain the grounds for the complaint, 
and demonstrate to at least a threshold degree, th~ir 
substance through supporting attachments, etc. Mere 
naked, unsupported allcgutions or legal conclusion:; do not 
satisfy this requirement. Rather, the petition0r l1as a 
burden to make an initial showin<J of mf'rit, and mu:;t 
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provide the rcviPwing court with certain information so that 
a determination may be made by the court 1-1hether the petition 
is frivolous, whether issues raised have been previously 
adjudicated, or whether they are excluded by the waiver 
doctrine. Such determinations may even be made before 
the respondent is required to file an answer or other 
responsive pleading. Rule 65B (i) (2). (Also see the Rules 
governing federal writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.; 
§ 2254, 1-1hich provide for such summary dismissal prior to 
requiring any pJ.eading by respondent). 
Contrary to appellant's assertions, a determination 
of the applicability of Utah's waiver doccrine may clearly be 
made by the court based on the face of tt!C ha1:.r, ::c corpus 
pleadings without the entire record of an· ~· c.ceedings 
before the court. Given the comprehensive nature of the habeas 
corpus pleadings, the reviewing court may determine 
expeditiously that the petitioner appealed his conviction and 
raised certain issues on appeal. (Recall that Rule 65B(i) 
(2) requires the petitioner to identify the appellate 
proceedings and state the results). The court may, then, 
based upon an objective determination, summarily dismiss any 
issues which it sees were previously adjudicated on appeal. 
Likewise, a subjective determination may be made whether the 
issues now rrli~c(l lll the complaint could or should have 
been rctisecl onclire:ct i.!ppeal, and if so, determine that they 
are exclude.',; hy the v;u.ivcr doctrine. (Point I, supra). 
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In the instant case, appellant failed to compl.et<'l~' 
provide the court with the information re~uired by Rule 
65B(i) when he filed his col'lplaint. Thus, v1hen respondent 
filed his motion to dismiss, he attached copies of the 
requisite documents contemplated by Rule 65B(i), to-wit: 
copies of prior decisions of the Utah and United Stat~s 
Supreme Courts and briefs filed by the respective p~rties 
in those actions. These documents clearly provided <tMple 
basis for the court to determine that the issues raised in 
appellant's complaint either were raised or could have been 
raised on direct appeal. Moreover, appellant was accorded 
the opportunity at the hearing on respondent's motion to 
dismiss to rebut the applicability of the waiver doctrine 
and explain why the issues in his petition were not raised 
on appeal. Obviously, the court found the appellant's 
arguments (excuses) unpersuasive. 
Appellant asserts that Judge Sawaya must have the 
entire record of prior proceedings before him "in order to 
make a determination that the raising of an issue is foreclos~C 
by the doctrine of res judicata," citing Parrish v. Luyten City 
Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). Again, appellant has 
confused the doctrine of res judicata with the uniC]ue habeas 
corpus doctrine of waiver and thus the case is inapplicL!ble. 
Moreover, given the drastic difference between the ~xter•t and 
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scope of the pleadings in habeas corpus as opposed to regular 
civil pleadings, the case has little application. Also, it 
should be noted that in Parrish a summary judgment was 
reversed and the matter remanded because ". [a] survey 
of the record (revealed) that the defendant never submitted 
a copy of the pleadings and judgment (in the prior decision) 
(Emphasis added.) Parrish, supra, at 1087. The 
clear implication of Parrish is that a determination of res 
judicata may be made without an evidentiary hearing when the 
court has the pleadings and judgment from the previous 
proceeding before it which was the situation in the instant 
case. 
Finally, it is difficult to see hoe: a ,:,T, of the 
complete record of this case, presumably including the 5000 
page trial transcript and hundreds of exhibits, would have 
had any relevance to a determination of the waiver doctrine 
issue. The only critical question was whether the issues 
raised in the habeas corpus complaint were or could have been 
raised on appeal. Judge Sawaya did not have to go beyond the 
face of the pleadings in reaching his decision on the waiver 
doctrine, and thus could properly rule on respondent's motion 
to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary 
judgment. In doing so, he made a determination of the legal 
insufficiency of appellant's claims because relief could not 
be granted thereon due to the waiver doctrine. 
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A party's assertion that 0uestions of fact exist, 
may be dis~issed by a court if, in reality, the factual 
assertions merely color what is essentially a }-e<Jal issue. 
Spinkellink v. Wainwri']ht, 578 F.2d 582, 590-591. In 
~inkellink, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
lvhen, hm·tever, it affirmatively appc0rs 
from the petition that a petitioner is not 
entitled to the writ, an evidentiary hr-•aJ-in<J 
is unnecessary. . For example, if a netitioner's 
habeas corpus allco']ations raise legal questions 
only, a district court's refusal to hold an 
evidentiary hearing does not violate the directive~ 
of T01·mscnd (crownsend v. Sain, 372 U.s. 293 (] 963)) 
or Section 2254(d). . This rule would also apply 
when a trial court holds an inadequate evidentiary 
hearing, for if only questions of law arc involved, 
an evidentiary hearing to develop fully the facts 
underlying a petitioner's co~plaints would be 
pointless. (Citations omitted.) 
578 F.2d 590. 
Appellant focuses on essentially five issues which he 
contends were improperly dismissed by Judge Sawava. Scrutiny 
of these issues reveals that each was either an issue that 
could or should have been raised on appeal, or was a legal 
issue that could properly be disposed of by Juclqc Saw;aya 
without an evidentiary hearing. The issues discussed here 
are raised at pages 13-14 of the Brief of Appellant. 
First, appellant contends that Judge Sawaya "(r]cjectr 
Appellant's specific allegation that the death pcnaltv was 
being imposed on him for reasons not per~issible 11nder the 
Constitution," citing pauc 28 of the transcript of the NovL·~·h· 
11, 1978, hearing befor0 JU~'JC Sawaya. The io; sues ra i scc1 by 
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Mr. Ford, counsel for appellant, at page 28, included the 
element of prosecutorial discretion in imposing the death 
penalty as well as "[w]e are not limiting our allegations 
to prosecutorial discretion but we are looking, as the 
Court did in Furman, at the Hhole system." (Emphasis 
added.) Respondent contends that the court was adequately 
informed on the issue of prosecutorial discretion on the 
basis of the pleadings. A discussion of the issue was 
included in respondent's memorandum to the court in support 
of his motion to dismiss. As for the "issues" raised in 
reference to "the whole system," responden':: main":ains that 
this claim is exactly the type of "vague a~~ s~ ~ative" 
issue which Judge Sm-1aya found unworthy of coJ,., ~cion. 
Appellant cannot be found to have met the burden of Rule 
65B(i), requiring specificity, by simply alleging a legal 
conclusion that elements of discretion are improperly present 
in "the whole system." Moreover, the issue of prosecutorial 
discretion could have been raised on appeal, as shown by 
respondent's memorandum to the lower court tracing the roots 
of the argument to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
other earlier cases. The remaining claims of discretion through-
out the entire system were properly dismissed as a matter of 
law as failing to comply with the pleading requirements or 
Hulc 65B(i). 
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Second, appr"lla.nt a.rgl!es that "[t)hc death pcnCJlly 
was being administered 'arbitrarily and discrimina.torily 
aga.inst the poor and outcast whose alleged victims are 
white'." This issue is dealt with dispositively in Point V, 
infra, and is precisely the type of seemingly factual claim 
that can nevertheless be dismissed as a matter of law. It 
wa.s dealt with in just this fashion in Sflink.::_llink, su_r:_r_'l_, 
wherein the court stated that such legal issues in genc~al 
could be disposed of without a hearing, 578 F.2d 590, and 
that a claim of racial discrimination specifically should 
be dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 612-Gl6. Certiorari 
was denied by the United States Supreme Court on tl1is issue 
and others in Spinkellink on March 26, 1979. 
Third, appellant argues that "[t)he jury in his 
case was actually a.ffectcd and prejudiced by improper outside 
influences." The essence of this claim is that appellant 
is now prepared to show actual jury prejudice because of 
alleged improper influence and that he did not and could not 
raise this claim on appeal because he did not know he had 
to show actual prejudice to prevail on this claim until this 
Court rendered its decisions in State v. PiEC_r___F_E?, suo_ra, ancl 
State v. Andre1vs, supra (Trans. ll/30/78 at 9). 
The issue of jury prejudice was in fact raised on direct 
appeal and respondent at that time clearly argued that 
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appellant's burden was to show actual prejudice. Appellant 
failed to rebut that argu!Tient by !Tieans of a reply brief, 
oral argu!Tient or petition for rehearing. The issue clearly 
was not a novel one that arose out of this Court's opinion. 
Rather, this Court merely accepted the legal argu!Tients 
and prior case authorities on this issue which were asserted 
by responcle;1t. Appellant, on direct appeal, clearly could and 
should have argued that he was not required to show actual 
jury prejudice to prevail, or, in the alternative, assert on 
appeal any facts to support a claim of actual jury prejudice. 
Thus, this issue was properly dismissed by Judge Sawaya under 
the waiver doctrine as being an issue \lhich either \vas raised 
or could have been raised on direct appeal. 
Fourth, appellant contends that the verdicts of 
guilt were not sufficient enough to comply with what appel-
lant argues is a requirement of Lockett v. Ohio, 57 L.Ed.2d 
973, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), i.e., that appellant was never found 
to have taken life or intended to take life. This argument is 
dealt ,,.:ith in more detail in Point IV, infr~, wherein 
respondent argues (l) that appellant's conduct in the instant 
case is so distinguishable from defendant Lockett's as to 
make the case inapplicable, (2) appellant atterrtpts to elevate 
one statement of a concurring Justice (in disregard of the 
central holding of the case) far beyond its meaning, and (3) 
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appellant has failed to make the requisite shoHing for 
retroactive application of the case. This issue is legal 
in nature, going to the constitutional basis of Utah's 
death penalty procedure, and was a proper matter for dismissal 
as a matter of law. 
Finally, appellant asserts that the court "[r]uled 
that substantial claims of constitutional rights violations 
were not available to appellant, without determining from any 
record whether he had personally waived them or whether his 
counsel had in any previous proceeding been afforded the 
opportunity to assert them." Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14. 
This claim combines appellant's claim of the necessity of 
a complete record (discussed supra within this Point) and the 
standard of waiver (discussed supra in Point I). The issue 
concerning the record is an issue of law. The issue of the 
waiver of claims is resolved by a comparison of the pleadings 
in the habeas corpus case with those filed in earlier actions 
plus the decisions in prior cases. As a result, it, too, 
could be dismissed as a matter of law. 
The above analysis of the five points asserted by 
appellant on this issue indicates the soundness of Judge 
Savraya' s ruling. Each one was properly dismissed because it 
could have been raised on appeal or because it Has a l:_egal 
issue subject to a motion to dismiss. 
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As a concluding argu~ent on this point, respondent 
avers that the district courts of this state have inherent 
and statutory power in aid of their jurisdiction to dismiss 
sua sponte any matter which, in the sound discretion of the 
court, is not an appropriate matter for further consideration. 
This would encompass appellant's assertion that Judge Sawaya 
improperly reached the merits of certain issues in the petition. 
The courts need not rely upon counsel to point out every 
impropriety or deficiency in proceedings, but may act upon 
its own, with due process, to provide justice. Such power is 
necessary, for example, to increase the productivity and 
efficiency of the courts through elimination of matters 
lacking a proper case or controversy, Such elimination is 
especially necessary in habeas corpus cases, where significant 
numbers of frivolous allegations are brought by prisoners 
hoping to escape justice. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-24 (1978), 
specifically states: 
[W)hen jurisdiction is, by statute, conferred 
on a court or judicial officer, -all means necessary 
to carry it into effect are also given and, in the 
exercise of jurisdiction. [sic) If the course of 
proceeding is not specifically pointed out, any 
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be--
adopted which may appear most conformable to the 
spirit of the statute or of the iules of procedure. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, the judge, in order to satisfy 
himself that there was a proper case or controversy before 
him, heard at length from appellant concerning what evidence 
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he might introduce in support of his allegations. Appellant 
was not able to cite one piece of relevant, material evid~nce 
which he intended to introduce to establish his claims and whid 
was not subject to rejection as a matter of law. 4 In the face 
of the absence of allegations of relevant evidence to be 
presented at a hearing, the court had not only the power, but 
the obligation to dismiss the case as a matter of law. 
To summarize, respondent submits that the proceducc 
employed by Judge Sawaya in this case was properly grounded 1n 
Utah rules, statute, and case law. A motion to dismiss, n0t a 
motion for summary judgment, was granted pursuant to valid 
authority and based upon adequate information supplied hy the 
pleadings and oral argument of counsel. 
4 Concerning allegations 12A, 2, 3, and 4 (of appellant's 
amended petition), appellant merely stated that the Utah 
Supreme Court had not effectively dealt therewith, and that 
appellant wanted to "force" the Utah Supreme Court to ''face 
those issues." (Trans. of 11/30/78 at 15-16). 
Concerning allegations 12A, E and F, appellant stated 
that they were going to produce evidence of seven cases of 
murders as heinous as appellant's where the death pe~alty 
was not imposed (T.l7-18). Such evidence is not relevant 
to the issues as a matter of law as discussed infra, Point V. 
Concerning the final allegations 12G, H and I, no 
evidence was mentioned; only a frivolous argument was 
made that there is no bifurcated hearing in Utah on all 
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances because 
one such circumstance (the one necessary to raise the 
crime from second to first degree murder) has already been 
heard during the guilt phase of the trial (T.l8-19). 
See the virtual absence of mention of any new, relevant 
evidence from separate counsel (T.26-29). 
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POINT III. 
PETITIOi,JER /1AY !lOT BELJEFIT FROM THE 
RETRO~CTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW CASE 
LAI'l IN f', PETITIOn FOR _1\ COLLATERII.L REMEDY 
SOUGHT AFTER A DIRECT APPEAL HAS BEEN 
TAKF'l. 
Appellant seeks to reap the benefits of case 
law that has been announced since his direct appeal was 
decided in November, 1977. Appellant argues that 
selected cases should be retroactively applied, citing 
Hankerson v. North, Cctrolina, 432 u.s. 233 (1977) in support 
of his contention. The underlyinq rationale of Hankerson 
and the very cases cited as controlling authority therein 
highlight the crucial distinction that appellant has 
failed to make. That is, cases arising in the cc~text 
of a collateral remedy (habeas corpus) do not profit 
from retroactive application of new case law, whereas 
cases before an appellate court on direct appeal do 
benefit therefrom. 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, was before 
t~e Cnited States Supre~e Court on direct apneal, the 
appellant claiming error in the trial court's failure to 
instruct on a theory of self-defense. Subsequent to 
his conviction, yet prior to the decision of the Supreme 
Court oE North Carolina on appeal, the case of Mullaney 
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v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), was decided, givin~ 
support to the appellant's claim. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the North Carolina 
Suprer.1e Court and held Hullanev to be retroactive. 
Justice Powell, concurring in Hankerson, stressed the 
importance of finality in the criminal justice system 
and historical limitations on habeas corpus in embracing 
the concurrina ooinion of Justice Harlan in Williaus v. 
J " -------
United States, 401 0. ;. 646, 676 (1971). Justice' 
Marshall, also concurring in Hankerson, noted the 
distinction bebveen collateral attack and direct review 
and also cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Williams as 
setting forth the correct position. 
In Williams, Justice Harlan distinguishes the 
function of the Court on direct review as opposed to 
habeas corpus or some other collateral remedy anJ 
differentiates between the nature of the two proceedings 
themselves. Justice Harlan concludes that on petitions 
fer writs of habeas cor?~S, the petitioner may not benefit 
f=orn case law that arose after the direct appeal of 
petitioner's conviction. The two exceptions to thi3 
position are (1) matters concerning substantive due 
process and (2) a denial of procedures that are ''implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty." 401 U.S. at 691. 
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As an exa~ple of the first exception, Justice Harlan 
cites Stunley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). For the 
second exception, Yick Wo v. Hopkin~, 118 U.S. 3~6 (1885) 
Respondent submits that the claims raised by appellant 
in the instant case do not even approach the dramatic 
reversal of prior case law as involved in Stanlev (First 
Amendment private possession of obscene material) or 
Yick Wo (landmark equal protection case). Justice 
Harlan's position opposing the retroactive application 
of law in habeas corpus cases is clear. 
Habeas corpus always has 
been a collateral remedy providing 
an avenue for upsetting judgments 
that have become othenvise final. 
It is not designed as a substitute 
for direct review. The interest 
in leaving concluded litigation 
in a state of repose, that is, 
reducing the controversy to a final 
judgment not subject to further 
judicial revision, may quite 
legitimately be found by those 
responsible for defining the 
scope of the writ to outweigh 
in some, many, or most instances 
the competing interest in re-
adj~dicating convictions according 
to all le~al standards in effect 
when a habeas petition is filed. 
Indeed, this interest in finality 
might well lead to a decision 
to exclude completely certain legal 
issues, whether or not properly 
determined under the law prevailing 
at the time of trial, from the 
cognizance of courts administering 
this collateral rer•edy. 
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401 u.s. 682-83. 
Numerous other :1abeas corpus cases support 1-h:c non-
retroactivity position of Justice Harlan. See, e.g., 
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (l96'o') (seizure o:': 
speech); Linkletter v. 1"/alker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) 
(refusal to retroactively apply Mapp v. Ohio); Adams v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (presence of co'_:nsel at 
preliminary hearing); Johnson v. New Je~scv, 38~ U.S. 
719 (1966) (refusal to retroactively 2'>_"ly lciranda a:1,2 
Escobedo). The reluctance :Jf the United StaL"s Suprcnc 
to invoke retroactivity is apparent. 
In State v. Belgard, 25 Utah 2d 188, 479 
P.2d 343 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court in effect refused 
to retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), to a guilty plea by the defendant entered in 
1963. While Belgard involves a retroactivity provision 
concerning Miranda (Miranda was expressly made non-
retroactive. 384 U.S. at 732), and thus is not directly 
on point, respondent submits that this Court is sensitive 
to the policy arguments concerning retroactivity, as 
evidenced by Belgard and State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 
1977). In Kelbach, this Court refused to give retroactive 
application to a proposed judicial change to the state's 
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right to appeal. The decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court reflect a lir1itation on retroactivity that is 
consistent with the position of the United States 
Supreme Court expressed in Williams, supra. 
Appellant asserts that a defendant cannot 
be bound by a waiver of a right resulting from the 
acts of his counsel. Respondent contends that appellant's 
assertion is contradic'ce0 by the recent case of I·Jainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Chief Justice Burqer, concurring). 
Chief Justice Burger concludes that a defendant is, 
indeed, bound by the decisions of his counsel at trial. 
See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (l970) 
Respondent submits that the same logic applies to 
strategic decisions involved in taking an appeal. Picking 
two or three selected issues for appeal as opposed to 
the so-called "shotgun" approach is a decision that 
counsel, as the person best informed, must make. ,Tust 
as a layman cannot be expected to make objections 
during the course of a trial, he cannot be expected to 
fornulate issues for the appeal of his conviction. 
Therefore, the Wainwright rationale concerning matters 
waived at trial should be equally applicable in the 
instant case concerning the appeal process. 
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Respondent avc::rs the~t th<e reasoning of ,Justj ce 
Harlan in lhllie~ms, supra, is souncl. If finnlity C:icl not 
have a legitimate place in the criminal justice syste~, 
retroactivity could be used to extend 9ost conviction 
litigation almost indefinitely. Every minor change in 
any part of the law touchin~ a conviction could be used 
as a vehicle to reconsider a co.se time etnd tirne ac;.J..in. 
The case law that has arisen since appellant's COIIViction 
does not effect a radical change in the prior law. 
Certainly appellant has not been denied any procedure 
that is implicit in the concept of ordered libertv. 
Appellant states that the new constitutional 
doctrine that he relies upon "touches the truth-
finding function" and is therefore "presumably retroactive". 
(Brief of Appellant at 17). The phrase "truth finding 
function" is taken from Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 
U.S. 203 (1972), wherein the Court stated, 
\.There the major purpose of new 
constitutional doctrine is to over-
co~e an aspect of the criminal 
trial that substantially impairs 
its truth-finding function and so 
raises serious questions about the 
accuracy of guilty verdicts in 
pas~ trials, the new rule has been 
giv~n complete retroactive effect. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id. at 204. 
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In citinq this ~Clss:tcJP frorrt Ivan V., the Court 
ewphasizes that thrcrc~ JCIC:5t be sub::;tantial impairr~ent of 
the truth-finding function in order for the retroactivity 
doctrine to take effect. "32 U.S. at 243. 
Appellant has not shown with any specificity 
(1) any substantial impairment of the trut~-findin~ 
function or ( 2) hovi the ne'.l case: law upon 1-1hich he 
places his reliance raises serious ~uestions about the 
accuracy of the guilty verdict in appellant's conviction. 
Respondent submits that the failure to make these 
showings removes any "presumptive retroactivity" and 
in fact indicates that retroactivity is entirely 
inappropriate in the instant case. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
THE UTAH DEA'I'H PENALTY STATUTES REMAIN 
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND IN LIGH1 OF 
RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS. 
Respondent submits that appellant's arguments 
concerning the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty 
statutes, like the other claims raised in the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus filed below, are precluded by the 
1vaiver doctrine discussed supra in Point I. That is, 
these arguments could and should have been raised en direct 
appeal. Also, respondent submits that appellant has 
failed to make an adequate showing to merit retroactive 
application o£ the new cases upon which he relies. 
Respondent's arguments on retroactivity are discussed 
in Point III, supra. However, should this Court desire 
to review the merits of these claims, respondent maintains 
that the issues are without legal merit. 
Appellant raises three basic claims in attacking 
the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty statutes. 
First, h~ claims that the sentencing portion of the trial 
in a Utah capital case is deficient in the following 
respects: (a) no notice is given to a defendant of the 
grounds (aggravating circumstances) upon which the death 
-56-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pC'nal ty is sought; (b) the State is not required to 
expressly plead or prove thC' grounds supporting the death 
penalty; (c) no factual findings stating the specific 
considerations relied upon by the jury is required and 
(d) appellate review is not adequate because of the 
absence of factual findings. Second, appellant argues, 
based on Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), that 
the death penalty may not be applied to appellant because 
he was not specifically found to have personally taken life 
or intended to take life. Third, he argues that the method 
of execution in Utah constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Respondent submits that the sentellc:"' \ __ ,_:: 1_-tion 
of Utah's death penalty statutes is sound. The claim of 
lack of 11otice of the grounds upon which t_he State seeks 
to rely in supporting the death penalty is rebutted by the 
succinct clarity of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1953), as 
amended. This section lists the eight aggravating 
circumstances for first degree murder, one or more of 
which must be alleged, proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
and found hy the trier of fact in a capital case. Any 
criminal defendant faced with a capital charge is put 
on notice of these eight aggravating circumstances; if 
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th. prosecution c{1nnot prove at least- on0 of th~~ eiqh~~, 
a cko th sc:'ntpnce cannot be inrns<?c1. The stiitutory 
enuPteration of the2s<? factors allmnc; a rh'fenc!an t to 
prepare a defense> on each of the <Jrounrls; he is sufficiently 
trier of fact 1'1\lst find in order to sup"ort a death 
sentence. 
u.s. 
58 L.EcJ. 2<1 207 (1978), in ,>l:ter'1ptin'] to shoH thJt 
no not_ice 1.1as r:;i 'o hil'1 of the src'cific gronnc1s relied 
upon by the sente~cinCJ authority. Thus, appellant argues, 
he had no orpo•-r-uJJity to contest these' grounds. Gardner 
and Presnell are easily distinguishable fran the instant 
case. 
In Garclnc:r, an individnal \-las convicted for 
first degree rmrcler for the kill_in'] of his \-life in "a crine 
of 'marital passion"'. \Jhile the> jury considered 
presentence report on the defendant. 
a recorm~cnc1a tion of life impr isonmc'n t The triul 
juclqc-, relying 0n i1 confidential section of the 
pre sen Lcnce rcpor t v1h ich ''>'JS not rcV('il -1 r·cl to the 
dcfcnc1anl nor inclwlccl as part of t!H· record on ,>ppcill, 
ordcerccl that the· c1c·a lh pen a 1 ty be' i I'l!'CJ:;r'c1. 
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Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing the 
secret nature of the information relied upon by the 
judge and stating: 
[i]t is important that the 
record on appeal disclose to the 
reviewing court the considerations 
which motivated the death sentence 
in every case in which it is imposed. 
Without full disclosure of the 
basis for the death sentence, the 
Florida capital-sentencing procedure 
would be subject to the defects 
which resulted in the holding of 
unconstitutionality in Furman v. 
Georgia. 
430 U.S. at 361. 
The facts of Gardner are markedly different than those 
in the instant case. Appellant here was not sentenced 
on the basis of any "secret information"; as shown 
from the discussion of § 76 5-202, he was on adequate 
notice of the grounds upon which the sentencing 
authority would rely. ApJ cllant had ample opportunity 
to explain or deny any of thv aggravating circumstances 
relied upon by the prosecution. Most importantly, a 
cornplete record was transmi L ted to this Court for review. 
Aprellant state>s thilt "Gani~~ stands for the proposition 
that a system that permits l.he death sentence to be 
imposed without giving open and specific and consistent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasons cannot be sustained." (Brie[ of 7\ppcllant aL 
29). That propusition is not frustrated by the t:tah 
system viliich, in the instant case, provided the 
utah Supreme Court with a complete record on appeal 
that included each and every basis for the i~position 
of the death penalty. No secret information ~as present 
in the instant c~sc; full disclosure existed, thus 
preserving the constitutionality o[ Utah's capital 
sentencing phase. 
inapposite. In Presnell, Georgia statutes requin•d 
that the prosecution prove under the facts of the case 
murder COl'lii1ittc-i , de ensaged in the> coJYtmission of a 
kidnapping with b~dily injury in order to support a 
capital offense. The offenses of rape and sodomy had 
also been committed by the defendant in addition to the 
murder and kidnapping. The key eler1ent in the pros<ecution's 
case in support of the death penalty was a findin1 of 
bodily injury in connection with the kidnapping charge. 
Despite t~:~ fact that the jur~r hnd not explici_tly found 
any bodily injury, the Georgia Suprer1e Court affirr1ed 
the death sentence, stating that evidence of Lodily 
injury was clearly apparent fro~ a review or the record. 
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In reversing the sentence, the United Sta.tes Supre11e 
Court found that the defendant had no notice whatsoever 
of the grounds upon which the state was relying to 
prove the requisite aggravating circumstance. 58 L.Ed. 
2d at 211, n.3. Thus, the defendant was denied any 
opportunity to rebut the state's case before it was 
submitted to the jury during the sentencing pha.se. 
In the instant case, appellant was on notice 
of the provisions of § 76-5-202 before the case was 
submitted to the jury during the sentencing phase. 
Unlike Presnel~, the "fundar.1ental principles of 
procedural fairness" were adhered to in appellant's 
case. The jury in the instant case had already found 
at least one a~gravating circumstance proved bc~ond 
a reasonable doubt before the sentencing phase began. 
Thus, appellant cannot complain that he wa.s denied the 
chance to rebut the state's case against him in the 
sentencing portion of the trial. Neither the case 
law nor the facts of the instant case suoports 
a.:JCJella"t 's co:~tc:ction that he had no notice of the 
grounds upon v1hicl1 the death penalty would be based. 
Appellant also argues that the state was not 
required to ple~d or prove any aggravating circumstances 
beyond a rcasornJ,le doubt. This argument is also 
refuted by th<' fact thi1t the state had to prove at least 
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prove one agqravatin9 circumstance beyond a reasonablE' clo•t!tl~ 
at the guilt phase. Contrary to appellant's as~ertio~, 
the (Jnitc'd State's Supreme Court hets nev<'r explicitly 
requirPd tho prosecution to provide aggravating circumstan~cs 
at the sentencing phase in addition to those proved at tlw 
guilt phase. In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), thr' Court 
approved of a proc2Jure very similar to Utah's and statC'd: 
l·ihile Te:<Js hil:3 nut adopted a 
Jist of statutory aggravating 
circumst'lnces the c::istence of lvhich 
can justify the imposition of the 
death penetlty as hetve Georgia and 
Florida, its action in narrowinq the 
Ciltegories of murders for which i1 
deJth sentence mc;y ever be in·,posed 
serves much the same purpose 
In fact, each of the five classes of 
murders made capital by the Texas 
stutute is encompassed in Georgia 
and Florida by one or more of their 
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
For Px~m9le, the Texas statutP 
requires the jury at the guilt~ 
determining stage to consider whether 
the cr imc was comrni t ted in the cour ~; e 
of a particular felony, whethrcr it was 
committed for hire, or whether the 
defendant was an inmate of a penal 
institution at the time of its 
co~nmission. 'I'hus, in c:>sscncc, 
t~e Texas statute rcc:ui~~~ tho~ lhe 
ju~~· fir1d the existo~ce o~ ~ sLatutot 
a;"_;rava ting circumstance h--:·io.rc, the: 
death penalty may be imposed. 
428 U.S. al 270. 
Appellant's reliance on Garc1ner v. Florirlc~ lS lllisplaccd, 
as argucu abo'.·~,; Gardner involvcc1 SC'cnct, un rcvczt 1 L'd 
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inforrna ti,•n used i~1 the S!:r,tenci nq phase which did not 
,orm tlw Lasis for a sufficient record on appeal. The inst<:~nt 
cas~ docs not strffer from the same procedural infirmities. 
Appellant next argues that the absence of written factual 
fiw'ings by the jury in the sentencing phase amounts to prejudicial 
error. This issue was, in fact, raised on appellant's direct appeal 
and expressly rejected by this Court. State v. Pierre, supra; 
The issue was also rai~cd hy appellant 
in hio; p"tition for certiorari l'lhich was also reJected by the 
United States Supreme Court. The argument is also unpersuasive. 
He~uirin0 the state to prove at least one 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt at 
the guilt phase of the proceedings in Utah minimize~ the 
need for written findings of an aggravating eire ~-, 
Indeed, such a requirement is nruch more favorablc to the 
accused than Florida's systerf\vl: i ch merely requires the finclinrJ 
o£ an aggr~vating circumstance at the sentencing hearing by 
a majority vote ancl later gives the trial judge a virtual 
Cndc~ such a s;stt· written findings become 
Moreover, under the Georgia capital sentencing 
procedure, there is no reguirer·1c·nl that a record be kept of 
the scntcncin') hcarLng. Eatlw1, a·l1 the Georqia procedurc 
p!·ovid<·s for is a tr<.mscript of th<' trial (not the sentencing 
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proceeding) and a six and one-half paqe questionnn,-, tr(e 
completed by the trial judye which is transmitl~ccl Lo the 
revie\viny court. In Utah, the transmission to th~ 
reviewing court of the entire transcript of the sentencing 
proceeding provides far more information than docs a 
six and one-half page questionnaire--such a transcript better 
enables the revie1-1ing court to examine for itself whellter 
the sentence of death is supJorted by the evidence and to 
determine if preju~icial error occurred. In short , th2 
revie\vlng court ner'd not rely solely on the trizll_ jucLjl'' s 
or jury's charact~rization of the sentencing proceeding. 
Thus, Utah's appellate review procedure in which 
the entire trial and sentencing transcript is reviewed to 
determine if the ser1tence resulted from prejudice, arbitrary 
action or caprice, better fulfills the constitutional concerns of 
Greg~,~~ and ~roffitt v. Fl~Fida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has statcrl that sn lnnn 
as the record reveals the evidPntiarv basis for lhR imoosition 
of the death penolty so as to ensure that the annPllnt:P r:ourt 
may co:1c:uct o. COr:1!__)rehe!1si\~e re'Jie· ... : of the procc""_d l nr;s and 
ensure that the penalty was not imposed arbitrarily or 
capriciously, the concerns of Furman v. Georqia, 40R u.s. 238 
(1972), are met. _g_ardne_r __ '0__ F_lor_ida_, ~~p~ at 361 (1977) 
The Supr<· ·'" Court mude it very cleo.r in ~~c~r'J:> 
supr.-t, that vnitt<'n finc1inqs by the scnlcncing aulhority \vC're 
not neccc>sa,:y for compliance with trw mdnclutc's or c·iiltcJ 
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the Eighth oc Fourteenth Amendments. Under the Texas 
stat11tory scherc1e, all the jury is required to do is answe:c 
~~yes·~ t~o the follo\ving questions: 
(l) whether the conduct of the 
defendant that caused the death of the 
deceased was committed deJiberately 
an~ with the recsonable expectation 
that the death of the deceased or 
another would result; 
(2) whether there is a proba-
bility that the defendant \'lOuld commit 
criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing th~eat to 
sociccty; und 
(3) if raised by the evidence, 
whether the conduct of the defendant 
in killing the deceased was unreasonable 
in response to the provocation, if 
any, by the deceased. 
Tex. Co0c Crim. Proc., Act. 37.07J (Supp. 1975-1976). 
The Texas Criminal Code of Proculure c1oes not 
require that the factors which were consi~~re: t,· the 
jury .i.n d!lS\·Icr inC) the questions be 1'- r it ten ancl transmitted to 
an app 0 llate court for review of the sentence, nor does the 
jury have to specify which aggravating circumstances they 
found prec;"nt in the case. Furthermore, no statutory 
jury. Y<"L, tho Supreme Court held th;c,_t the Texas 
Nor did 
th0 ~~xaR statutory schene require Lhat the Texas Court 
of Cr.iiiiillil 1\pp,."als conduct any pariirtllctr type of 
illll"'llill.<' rC'vic.:--oncl yet it was nol found to be con-
stiitlt ',n,•ll'.· infir-m. 
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The record in thio; case ·~evculccl the evid·~·u•~c 
supporting the u.ggravettirY) ci_rcur,tsLm,;c·s chat·g,•cl and 
disclosed that tlw evidt'nce presented in n•.itiqution of 
the offense was virtually nonexiste11t. Respondent submits 
thGJ.t so long as the entire record of the proceeding is 
such th.lt it discloses to the revie'.:incJ court thro eviden .,., 
which moti\'acc.ocl the death sentence in everi co.s00 in whic:h it 
is imposed, such a record m0c;ts the rr·qu i r0men L:; of c;_·,:.::c.'J•J , 
Jurek and Proffitt. 
Some fi1:al comments on thee is:;uec of vnitten 
findings must be made. It is importnnt for this Court 
to take note of what Gl.ppellant Andr~ws does not contend 
on this paint. He d~es not contend that he was sentenced 
to death on the bu.sis of information which was not contu.incd 
in the record of C>ither the trial or thC' sentencing proct.?ecling. 
Nor does he contend that the record which was transmitted 
to, and carefully reviewed by, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not contain any evidence which '.JiJ.c: prc;scnted a l E'i ther 
the guilt or sentencing phases of th~ bifucatcd pcocecdiny, cf. 
Gu.nlner \'. "lor-ic1a, 430 U.S. 349, 360-JGl (1917). 
The jury in the instu.nt CdS~ v1as not., ac; ilppellc1nt 
argues, free to impose the deu.th pc·nalty for "r0ason~; \-!holly 
outside tho~.;e recognized by lu\1" (l'.ri,_-f of appellant at 
21). This Court h<1s mandated that tl1c jury !lllJ';\. fincl thdt 
the aggravatinq filctors 0'.1tv1eiqh the mit ic;Jting factors, 
Thus, \ he• 
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jucy' s finc1inqs are grounded in stututory fuctors, not 
rcasun:-; outsid<-; thr; law. 
Appellilnt's argument that appellate review is 
fn1strJtul by the lack of \·Jr.itten findings ignores the 
position tal:en by the United States Supreme Court in 
In Gardner, the Supreme Court 
stated that an adequate basis for appellate review exists 
when the entire record of the trial is transmitted to 
the revie~ing Court and the record contains the busis for 
the findings at the triul level. 430 u.s. at 361. Respondent, 
thcrrcfore, sub11i ts that ap1x:llant' s claims of error 
regarding the procedural aspects of the sentencing phase of 
UtJh's death penalty procedure are without merit oc support. 
Appellant next argues that relief should be granted 
on the strength of Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), 
in which Justice White stated that "[i)t violates the 
Eighth Amendment to impose the penalty of death without a 
finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the 
death of the victim." Id. at 2983. It is significant to 
not0 the- :~cts upQn ~:hich Justice 1~hite•s statement is 
bJsecl. 
Sandril Lockett was sentenced to death as a 
conscquc-•ncc of her participation as the "\vheelman" in a 
roblJcry of a pa1vJ1shop that resulted in the murder of the 
The evidence was in conflict as to lvhether 
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Lockett even remaine'l in the v~icinity of the pa•.-m;lw;) 
duriny the robbery (it wa3 suguc~tcd that she may I• .vc 
left t11ce ;r~ca to qo and cJt lunch clse1-.;her:-0), much less 
that sJ. .o actively partici;:,a tcc1 in the shoo tiny. This i': 
in contrast to appellant's participation in the instant 
case that v1as acti_ve throughout the course of the robbc_:ry 
and multiple murders. It mdy be recC~lled that ap!JE'lLll1t 
was an active participant in the administration of the 
liquid drain cl<'anc'r to the victirr:s. 
The concurring opinion of clust-~~icc Blaci:I'nln is a 
succ cnct rebuttal to appellanl' s att<:cl1i£)l to expand Justice 
White's staterc1ent: far beyond its factuol conb:cxt. 
Blackmun states: 
I d0 not find entirely convincing 
the disproportionality rule embraced 
by my Brother W!IJTE. The rule that 
a defendant must hove had actual intent 
to kill, in order to be capitally 
sentenced, does not explain why such 
intent is the sole crit~crion of 
Justice 
culpability for Eighth Amendment purpo:;ec;. 
What if a dcf enclan t- personally comr:1i ts 
the act proximately causing death by 
pointing a loaded gun at the robbery 
victim, verbally threatens to use 
fatal fc-ce, adrittnJly does not intcnJ 
to cause a death, yet knowingly crEate~ 
a hi']h c;~-ol:Jet':lili t\· thil t the crun '.:ill 
discharge acciden~ally? Wha~ if a 
robber:y_ participant in orci~avoid 
capture --Gr c·-"'cn-f or \-:~toto:, s por L, 
E~ ~.~~_1.2_ -1 _-i-~f\--~-r1d-CT~::-flb:-~rr:l-L:: 1 y-li s c s <] r ,l. ·,; (' 
I?h;s ic- ~-- Eorce -~·_i_}}-;:-.:-c~ll_1 • ):C,-:Js in tenT-Eo 
lnfll.cl serious !Jo·:i I·; ii.tlrn, but nul 
to JZITI-;---;:;n([--il-cfr~., ti;-1~c~~:I1TCS?-!Ta vwe 
~ s j ud' J '" s ~~ ':_!Jl~ r<:,2:__1_::_ i_-'ll1_ tlt__. '\In c:~n_'1_r2_1_1 I~ 
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purpo~;cs th" ct!JS'~nce of a "conscious 
!)urpoc~c-;--c)-( prnclucinq death," ante, at 
:;2-iJ8"[Z_ t~a.\c;fonns the culpability of 
th_c.:_~c (f~:r,-.-r~lunts' actions? --
AIJplyi WJ a requirement of actual 
inU,nt to ki.ll to defendants not 
immcdiat,_•ly involved in the physical 
act causing ~cath, moreover, would 
run aCjrOuJ~d on intricate definitional 
problems attending a felony murd0r. 
Whctt intention rnay a State attribute 
to a rohlx:ry p::~rticipant \•Tho sits in ·the 
ge>talvO'/ car, !:nm-;s that a loaded gun 
will bP brandished by his companion 
in the ro!Jbery inside the store, is 
willing to have the gun fired iF 
ncccssa1y to make an escape but not 
to accomplish the robbery, when the 
viet i r1 is shot: by the companion cvc:l 
though not necessary for escape? \-iha.t 
if the unarwcd participant stands 
immcc1iatcly inside the store as a 
lookout, intends that a loaded gun 
merely be brandished, but never 
bothc:rPcl to c1 isc".Jss witL the 
t r.i ']gcnnan wha.t lirni ta tions v.~e~-e> 
ap;>~ o;:1r [,, 1 c• for the firing of t'~:, 
gun-.' \·,'hdl. if the sillTle lookoc':: 
pcrs0nRlly intended that the g.J~ 
novc1· be r i~recl, but, after his 
comp~nion fires a fatal shot to 
prc··.•con l t-lJ<e victim from sounding an 
alarm, ilp[JnJVcs and takes off? 
'1'ltc rcc;u i, Lment of actual intent to 
kill in ocrJc, to inflict the death 
penalty would require this Court to 
i;··.nusc-' uoc.:-:: the States 2.n ??laborate 
' 1 c:J:'"~-;t_i_ ~-~_ 1 ti-~_~c1iz::=~~~ defi21itio::1 of 
t~c r0qtl is i ~l' r:ten~ re3., involving 
m,.-,- i "'1 Pl obl em-s of line-drawing that 
n~rmall~ are left to jury discretion 
but tl1:tt, in rlisproportionality 
anc1 1 ''"is, ll.~vc to be decided as issues 
of L,l\i, and interfering with the sub-
sL.lnti·v·• c,lt•·got~·[cs of the States' 
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cl·im.1nill lull. And such u rule, 
even if wol-kable, is ~n inc·~mplelc 
method of ascertaining culp3billty 
for Eishtlt [,mendme:1t purposes, which 
n·:-~ce.~_;etrily is a more subtle mixture 
of action, in0ction, and dcgr~cs of 
mens rea. 
98 S.Ct. 2969-70, n. 2. 
In short, respon3ent contends that the instai1t cas2 is not, 
as characterized by Justice Marshall, an imposition of a 
"purely vlcarious theory of liubility." 98 S.Ct. at 2972. 
A?pellant lias an active pilrticipant in the premeditated 
series of r.1urdcrs that \"'ere c);_-a'.·In out in a fashior:. thal c,Jn 
only be characterized as torture. Sandra Lockett w~s a 
mere abettor in 2 i'1uJ·der reslllting from a punic]:cd robb""~. 
Moreover, the cc .. ~L~l focus of the Lockett Court is on the 
failure of the Otio statute to permit a broad consideration 
of numerous t1gating circumstances at the sentencing 
phase. Justice \"ihi te' s statement is ancillary lo this 
primary concern. Since Utah is specifically distinguished 
from Ohio by Justice Blackmun in note 3 at p. 2971, 
appellant's arglLcent on this issue should be considered \·:i thout 
fc:-ce. 
still vital holding of the Supreme Court 1n Wilk~rson v. 
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879): 
Cruel and unusual punishments arc 
forbidden by the Constitution, but 
the authorities referr0d to are 
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quit0 sufficient to show that the 
punishment of shooting as a means of 
executing the death penalty for the 
crime of murder in the first dearee 
is not included in that categor;, 
within th~ meaning of the eighth 
amendment. 
This language was also quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 178. Appellant failed to provide, as required by 
Rule GSR(i) (2), any support in his petition for his 
argur~ent t.hat execution by shooting does not corc.port 
with ct.:rn'nt standurds of public decenc:{. Respondent 
standa"Cds of c1cccncy, as evidenced by the failure of the 
legislature to change' the methods of execntion in this 
State. 1\s stated in ~regg: 
Therefore, in assessing a 
punishment selected by a democrat'~a·· 
elected legislature against the con-
stitutional measure, we presume its 
validity. We may not require the 
legislature to select the least 
severe penalty oossible so long as 
the penalty selected is not cruelly 
inhumane or disproportionate to the 
crime involved.· And a heavy burden 
rests on those who would attack the 
judafllent of the representatives of 
the ')PO£Jls. 
This is true in 9art because the 
constitutional test is intertwined 
with an assessment of contemporary 
standards and th0 legislative judgment 
Wl·iqhs hea"ily in ascertainino su~h 
standards. "rrJn a democratlC SOClety 
lejislaturcs,not courts, are constituted 
to resp(~nd to the will and consequently 
tho noral values of the people." 
Furman ~,eonJi::_, C'_~~· at 383 
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(BURGER, C.J., dissenting). The 
deference we owe to the deci~~ic1:1s cf the 
state legislatures under our feJcral 
system, 408 U.S., at 46~-470 (REHNQUIST, 
J., dissenting), is enhanc~J where 
the spc~cification of punisr ncnts is 
concerned for "these arc, peculi<-1xly 
questions of lcyislative policy." 
428 u.s. at 175-76. 
The lan9uage in Coke;- v. Gcorqia, 433 U.S. 584 
(1977), cited by appellant concerning "barbaric'' and 
"excessive" punishments is directed at the imposition of the, 
death penalty for the crime of rape. To attempt to stretch 
this language to apply to the means used in imposincJ the' 
sentence is to misapply the Court's reasoning and holding 
in Coker. Respondent contends that the death penalty 
itself serves valid penal interests for certain classes 
of murder and therefore meets the requirements of Coker. 
To attempt to rebut the suggestion that the 
only purpose served by shooting is the satisfaction of 
doctrines of the Mormon Church would lend credence to 
another unsupportable argument. No basis for this bald 
assertion is given and the cl~i~ shoul6 be disnisseJ. 
To conclude respondent's arguments on this 
point, it is submitted that Utah's sentencing prOCl'(hn-c 
is sound. The mandates of the United States Supreme 
Court were otservcd beth in statute and in practice_ 
-n-
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Lr:>ckc_::CI: _y_:__Q_l1io, sup.ca, is inapplicable in this case 
becau~;ce ( 1) appellant's acts •.vere markedly different than 
defendant Lockett's and (2) Utah's sentencing procedure is 
expressly distinguished from Ohio's in respect to the 
considcration of mitigating circumstances. Finally, 
execution by shooting remains constitutionally sound 
and Coke~c;e~_CL~_il._ is not offended because death 
is a proportionate sentence for certain classes of 
murder. Appellant's claims of error should be dismissed. 
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POINT V. 
APPELL!I:'T' S CLl\Hl THAT 'riiE DEATH PENALTY [~; 
BEING HlrOSPD IN UTAH l\ND TilE UNI'l'ED S'I'll'l'C:S 
RARELY, ARBITRARILY AND DISCRIMINATORILY 
\•lAS PROPERLY DISf•1ISSED BY JUDGE SA\•7l\Yl\ AS 
A HATTER OF LA\'1. 
Appellant's amcn~eJ petition for habeas corpus 
relief aJvanced the theory that Utah imposes the Jeath 
penalty "rarely and arbitrarily anJ discriminatorily 
against the poor and outcast •:•hose alleged victi1ns are 
"white 11 and whe:cf:: the cJo ~ r:_·ncia:: t is rr non-\vh i L o, rna l c, p::>or, 
and a stranger in the co!nmu'1i ty." (Appellant's AMended 
Petition at 8-9). He further alleged that the "p21ttern 
and practice" or the prosecution of the death pen,1l ty in 
Utah since the date of the re-enactment of the death 
penalty shov1s that it is being appl iecl capricious J y. 
Interestingly, appellant failed to attach to his p~tition 
any supporting factual data for these claims as r0<]Uirecl 
by Rule 65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of C.ivil Procedure, which 
prLvidcs that a post-conviction complaint: 
. shall s~t •orth in plain 
and concis~ ter~~s the [actual d21t2 
constitutin<J each and every manner in 
which the cornpluinant cL1ims thctl any 
consti tulional riqhts \vCJ c• violil ted. 
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'l'h<c ccw1plctint shall havce attached 
thc'rclo 2ffidavito3,- copies of 
records, or other evidence supporling 
such allegations, or sho.ll state 
why tl1e same are not a ttachecl." 
(Emphil~;is added) 
Also c;ee Point II, supra. Iloreover, at the hearing before Judge 
Sawaya on respondent's motion to dismiss the amended petition, 
appellant was given the opportunity to state what factual data 
he was relying on in support of this claiQ and his counsel merely 
respondccl with the conclusion that arbitrariness and capriciousness 
in the Zt!•Plic0tion of the death penalty had occurred (T.l2). 5 
The district court rulecl on appellant's racial 
prcjudic0 claim based upon two distinct theories. 
he concluded that: 
. all issues raised in 
petitioner's petition \verc knm·m 
nr should have been known at the 
time petitioner took his direct 
ilp;x~al from his convict jon teo the 
Utah Supreme Court, ilnci illl issues 
either were raised or could have been 
rdi ser·l on that i:tppeal, anc1 habeas 
corpu:.; mily not be used . . to 
raise issues which could have been 
raised on appeal. 
Order of November 30, 1978 at l-2 (R. 119-120). 
First, 
(Emphasis 
5 Mr. Pi0rr~'s counsel merel) added the claim that 
prosecuicn-s have in recenl c,>c;es impermissibly exercised 
tllf'i r cl i <;cretion in chargin'T CZlpi tal offenses, an 
i~'su<· Hilic:lt I<Jas raised to ar;c1 rejected by the United 
Stales Supreme Court in Greyer_, Jurek and. Proffitt, and 
the Fifth Circuit Couct of l\ppeals ln Splnkelllnk v. 
Vl:rirr,:ric;hl, 578 F.2d 582 (l'J71i) ,::_<c_rt. ?cnied __ U.S. 
--· (Ha1dl "1.6, 1':!79), as \r<ill Lc shO\vn infra (T.l6-l7). 
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Second, he found that the allegation "fails to ;:t,<tc i\ 
claim on which relief can Lc grantecl or on \,,hicll 0 hc:1rincr 
nec'd be held (Findings and Conclusions at 1; 
R. 12<1) . 
Judge Sa\;'aya was squctrcly \•lithin his pm·ilT in 
so ruling with respect to the first theory. ThR issue 
of discr.imination and impermissible discretionary appl ic::>.t.ion 
of the death penalty was raised by appellant in his direct 
appeal of his conviction, (J\ppellant Andcc·,·.'S' br i"'[, Point 
I, which reasserted Point I (p. 7-18) of appellant Pierre's 
brief in State v. Pierre, supra), and \vas pLc·Jiouc;ly 
resolved by this Court in State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 
709, 710 (Utah 1977), and State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338, 1345-1349 (Utah 1977). Although the main focu•; of 
appellant's argument on this issue during his direct 
appeal was on the provisions of Utah's capital punishment 
statutes on their face, nevertheless any claim of 
discrimination in the way those statutes were ~l:'f2l~icd 
in appellant's and Mr. Pierre's cases could likewise have 
(Sec Points V and VI of Pierre's brief, pp. 32-<12, which 
were reasserted by appellant Andrews). 
that Mr. Andrews and Mr. Pierre wece the first to be 
convicted unc1cc Utah's latest capital puqishn~L·:Il 
provisions. Nevertheless, they lverc cet·t0.inly nc,l 
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['reclude0 from raising claims of alleged arbitrariness 
capriciousn2ss, or discrimination which may have actually 
occurred during the course of their criminal proceedings. 
Moreover, any studies, reports, statistical analyses, 
theses, etc., which were available at the time of their 
appeal to support their clairn of arbitrariness or capriciousness 
in the imposition of the> death penalty could have been 
append•d to their briefs on appeal for this Court's 
consiueration, as per "Brandeis brief" in Muller v. Oregon, 
208 u.s. 412 (1908). 
Thus, tlre reasoning expressed in Point I of this 
brief, supr~, on the applicability and validity of the 
waiver doctrine to this issue> is re-asserted by 
respondent. The authorities outlined in Poi:1t I '''3iJ= 
clear that Judge Sa1,1aya' s ruling was propeL 'L'o ,Jer of 
lai-J. His finding that ~~ issues, including the instant 
one, either Here or could have been raised on direct 
appeal Has proper. 
Appellant attempts to circumvent the Haiver 
doctri~e by asserti~c th~t facts have developed since 
he took his direct appeal which 1-JOuld shoi-J that the 
c1cath penalty in Utah and the United States is being 
applied in an arbitrJry, capricious and discriminatory 
milnrH:c cle>spitc legislative efforts to draft capital 
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punishment statut~s which preclude such prublc~s. 
Appellant's theory is that if he can show discriminatory 
application of the death penalty occurring since his 
conviction and appeal, he can then assert th3t death 
penalty statutes, including Utah's, are inadcquat~ and 
unconstitutional, and have such a ruling apply retroactively 
to him. Appellant also asserts that he should ha•·e 
been granted a hearinq to pr2scont evidcn'>.' in su;'''ort 
of his claim. 
Appellant's suggested approach is not novel 
and was expressly rejected by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Spinkellink v.Wainwright, 578 r.2c1 582 
(5th Cir. 1978), cc!_r_!_. dPniec1 U.S. (;larch 26, 1979). 
In Spinko_l}ink, the petitioner u. ttacked c'lor ida's 
death penalty statute as applied conceding that the United 
States Supreme Court hu.d already upheld the statute on 
its face in Proff_itt :!· Florida, supra. Specifically, he 
alleged that the slu.tute was being applied arbittarily, 
capriciously, exccssJ~ely, and disproportion3tcly in 
that the statute 1·/as Lcin'J administered impermissibly and 
discriminatorily by pro~;rculors in the pleJ !Jarcruinincr 
process against defendants convicted of murdrring ~hiles 
as opposccl to bJ ack~c, etnd agetin~ot mules und poo1: i"'t·snns. 
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Id _ at ')')') _ Hr~ also cited to seven specific cases vlhere 
thee Flor Lcl<t Supreme Court set aside dea·th sentences despite 
the L1c L thdt they allegedly involved more heinous 
circums '.cll•CCco than his case. Id. at 602, footnote 25. 
The Fifth Circuit wrestled with petitioner's suggestion that 
the courtc; revic1:1 subsequent cases in search of evidence 
of ar~itrarincss and capriciousness and rejected the 
appro<lch based on the following rationale: 
If this latter interpretation 
is the correct reading of Proffitt, 
s0rious problems arise. First, e~ery 
cr li,cinal defendant sentenced to 
dc~th under Section 921.141 could through 
fcrteral habeas corpus proceedings attack 
the statute as applied by alleging 
that other convicted murders, equally 
or more deserving to die, had been 
SDared, and thus that the death 
p~nalty was being applied arbitra~J 
and c0priciously, as evidenced b• 
his own case. The federal courts 
then would be compelled continuously 
to question every substantive decision 6f 
t.llC' Florida criminal justice system 
with regard to the imposition of the 
death penalty. The intrusion would 
not be limited to the Florida Supreme 
Court. It would be necessary also, 
in order to review properly the Florida 
~:>~:-)_cem_'.J Cour~' s decisio!1s, to rcvi2\'l 
t~~· dstcr~i~ations of t~2 trial cou~ts. 
h~d in order to review properly those 
determinations, a careful examination 
of every trial record would be in 
orc1.:r. A thorough review \vould 
nr,:os •; ita to looking boh ind the 
c1urisions of jurors and crosecutors, 
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as well. Additionally, unsuccessful 
litigants could, before their 
sentences were carried out, ch~llengc 
their sentences aCJo.in o.nd again as 
each later-convicted murderer was 
givcon life imprisonment, because the 
circumstances of each additional 
defendant so sentenced would become 
additional factors to be consider~d. 
The process \·JOule! be neverending ar:·1 
the benchmark for comparison would be 
chronically undef incd. Furtlle1·, thec·c 
is no reason to believe that the 
federal judiciary can render better 
j uc; tice. l\s the Florida Supreme 
Court itself so candidly admits, 
see Pro\rence v. State, supra, 3.37 
so. 2cCat-78-~asonable persons 
can differ over the fate of every 
criminal defendant in every death 
penalty case. If the federal courts 
retried again and again the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances 
in each of these cases, we may at times 
reach results different from those 
reached in the Florida state courts, 
but our conclusions would be no more, 
nor no less, accurate. 
Such is the human condition. 
The Supreme Court in Proffitt 
or in Furman, ~. Jurek~ lvoorlson, 
or Robo~could not have intended 
these results. We understand these 
decisions to hold that capital punishment 
is not unconstitutional per se, and 
t~at a state, if it chooses, can 
ptJ:l.ish nr.J.rderers a.ncJ. seek to prate;<:~ 
its ci~izenr; by iro9osing the duath 
P~~alty - so long as it does so through 
a statute with appropriate standards 
to guide discretion. If a staLe h~rc; 
such a properly drawn statute--ani 
there can be no doubt that Florida has--
which the state follmvs in dcteuni ni rHJ 
which convicted defendants receive 
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the death pcnJlty and which receive 
life imprisonment, then the arbitrariness 
and capriciousness condemned in Furman 
have been conclusively removed. For 
us to read these cases otherwise would 
thrust this Court and the district 
courts into the substantive decision 
making of the state court sentencing 
process which is rightfully reserved 
to the Florida state judiciary under 
Section 921.141. Under the Constitution, 
as well as fundamental notions of 
federalism and comity, that is not the 
role of the fed~ral courts. Cf. Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 
27 L.Ed. 2d 669 (1971). 
A review of the record demonstrates 
dramatically that the Florida state 
trial court and the Florida Supreme 
Court performed their unenviable duty 
of sentencing Spenkelink (sic) under 
Section 921.141 with care and 
concern. Our inquiry must end there. 
As for Spenkelink's contention that 
this Court should go further, we thin~ 
the remarks of Justice White in l~lo: 
concurring opinion in Gregg v. Geo-
supra, 428 U.S. at 226, 96 S.Ct. at 
2949 (White, J., concurring), are 
responsive: 
Petitioner's argument that there 
is an unconstitutional amount of 
discretion in the system which 
separates those suspects who receive 
the death penalty from those who 
receive life imprisonment a lesser 
penalty or are acquitted or never 
charged seems to be in final analysis 
an indictment of our entire system of 
justice. Petitioner has argued in 
eff~ct that no matter how effective 
the death penalty may be as a punishment, 
govv,·nment, created and run as it must 
be by humans, is inevitably incompetent 
to administer it. This cannot be 
accepted as a proposition of constit·,tional 
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law. Imposition of the death 
penalty is surely an awesome 
responsibility for any system of 
justice and those who participate in 
it. Mistakes will be made and 
discrimin3tions will occur which 
will be difficult to explain. 
Ho·.:ever, one of society's most 
b2~ic tasks is that of protecting 
the lives of its citi~ens and one 
of the most basic ways in which it 
achieves the task is through criminal 
la1·1s against murder. I decline to 
interfere with the manner in which 
Georgia has chosen to enforce such 
laws on what is simply an assertion 
of lack of faith in the ability of 
the system of justice to operate 
in a fundamentally fair manner. The 
petitioner's contention is without 
merit. 
Id. at 604-606. 
Thus, Judge Sawaya's rejection of this approach based 
on either the waiver doctrine or on the merits was 
certainly proper. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, appellant Andrews 
also claims that Judge Sawaya erred in not granting 
him an evidentiary hearing to establish factually that the 
death penalty is now being applied in a racially 
discriminatory manner. The Fifth Circuit Court in 
Spinkellink also addressed this issue. They noted that 
Spinkellink had,in fact, received an evidentiary hParing 
on this claim in the federal district court (he claimed 
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on appeal that it 'tlilo; irwcJequatc and desired a rern"lnd 
to put on further evidence), hmvever, they held that 
such a hearing was unnecessary because the issue could have 
been dispc>sed of as a mo.tter of la'''· The Court reasoned 
as follow;;: 
Assuming for the sake of 
argument that the petitioner's 
statistic;; arc accurate, his 
contention must fail as a matter 
of la~ on Loth of the constitutional 
grounds relied upon. The allegation 
that Florida's death penalty is 
being discriminatorily applied to 
defendants who murder whites is 
nothing more than an allegation that 
the death penalty is being imposed 
arbitrarily anJ capriciously, a 
contention we previously have 
considered and rejected. To allege 
discriminatory application of the 
death penalty, as meant in the 
context of this case, is to 2r~~e 
that defenc1ants who have murdered 
whites ha~r received the death 
penalty 1,1hen other defendants 1vho 
have murd~red blacks, and who are 
equally or more deserving to die, 
have received life imprisonment. 
In order to ascertain through 
federal habeas corpus proceedings 
if the dcalh penalty had been 
discrimi~~torily imposed upon 
a petitioner v~1ose murder victim 
was whit0, a district court would 
have to comp1rc the facts and 
circumstances of the petitioner's 
case would be [sic] (1,1ith) facts 
ana circumstances of all other 
Florida cl''Zlth r"'naJ ty cases involving 
black vicLii'lS in order to determine if 
the first degree murderers in those 
cases were 0yually or more deserving to die. 
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The petitioner thus reyucsts ~he 
same type of case-by-c~se comparison 
by the federal judiciury that 0e 
have prcv ious ly re j ectcci in con:; i :1cr inq 
the petitioner's contention th~l 
Floridu's death prnalty is being 
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. 
We need not repeat the myriad of 
difficult problems, legal and 
otherwise, generated by such federal 
court intrusion into the substantive 
decision making of the sentencing 
process which is reserved tn the 
Florida state courts under Section 
921.141. As we previously noted, 
this Court reads Furman, Gregg, 
Proffitt, Jurek, G0odson,-.:mci-
Roberts as-holdin:;J-tl-10.-tif a stLite 
follows a properly drawn statute in 
imposing the deuth penalty, then the 
arbitrariness and capriciousness--
and therefore the racial discrimination--
condc~ned in Furman have been conclusively 
rewo.·e I. Floridal~as such a statute 
and it is being followed. The 
petitioner's contention under the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments is therefore 
without merit.40 
Footnote 40: 
As we pointed out in footnote 
28 supra with respect to the 
contention that Fiorida's death 
penalty is being imposed arbitrarily 
and capriciously, this is not to say 
that federal coilrts s:1oul~ ·.\:er 
concern thc.-".selves on feJera l habeas 
corpus review ',,~ith 1vhether Secc~ion 
921.141 is being L!pplied in a 
racially discriminatory fashion. 
If a petitioner cun show some speci(ic 
act or acts evidencing int<:'ntiona.l 
or purpo~cful racial discrlmination 
against him, see VillJCJE' of 1\rlinqlon 
Heights v. Hetrop(,~-:::-ii~r1li~>~l~_i_n~--·---
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Developm~nt Cnrp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68, 
97 s.ct. 555, 56-4-65, so L.Ed. 2d 450 
(1977), ei~her because of his own race 
or the r~· of his victim, the federal 
district ~~~rt should intervene and 
review substantively the sentencing 
decision. We ~nphasize once again, 
see note 28, supra, that this Court 
anticipates that such intervention 
will be infrequent and only for the 
most compelling reasons. Mere con-
clusory allegations, as the petition 
makes here, such as that the death 
penalty is heine; "administerGd 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily to 
punish the killing of white persons 
~s opposed to-~lack persons," 
Petitioner's Brief at~~ not 
constitute such reasons and would 
not warrant an evidentiary hearing. 
This is so on eighth amendment grounds 
as well as on fourteenth amendment 
equal protection grounds, because 
the intrusionary effect would be 
the same. 
Id. at 613-614. (Emphasis added). 
(For the Court's analyses of petitioner's Fourteenth 
amendment approach to this issue, see 578 F.2d 614-616 
wherein it concluded that for relief, petitioner would 
have to allege and prove a deliberate, racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose by the state to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
Thus, Judge Sawaya properly ruled that this 
issue failed to state a claim and did not require an 
evidentiary hearing. 
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Appellant's next claim is that becau;c of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging ca]Jital felonies and 
in the plea bargatning process, a pattern and practice 
has emerged which shows a discriminatory, arbitrary 
and cap~icious application of the death penalty. This 
claim also was properly disposed of by the lowec court 
as a matter of law in that the United St3tes Supreme 
Court has repeatedly dealt with the clai11 and rejected 
it. 
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The notion of prosecutorial discretion in charging 
a capital felony was fully and repeatedly discussed in the 
following cases: Hr. Justice Stev;art' s opinion in Gregg at 
page 199; !Vlr. Justice l~hite's opinion in Gregg at pages 224-225; 
Hr. Justice Pm;ell's opinion in Proffitt at page 254; Hr. Justice 
Stevens' opinion in Jurek at page 274; Mr. Justice Stewart in 
\·Joodson ~~- Nor:_t_h__S_:':_!:"_?_:~ina, 42b U.S. at 284 (1976); and finally, 
Me. Justice White's dissent in Roberts v. ~ouisiana, 428 u.s. 
at 348-349 (1976). The clear import of these discussions is 
that such an element of discretion in the prosecution of cacital 
cases is essential to the administration of the criminal justice 
system. Discretion at this slage does not rise to the 
level of a constitutional defect in ~~e state process 
regarding a capital felony. The per:-':c5~' latitude 
given a state prosecutor is addressed by Mr. Justice 
Stewart in Gregg: 
First, the petitioner focuses on the 
opportunities for discretionary action that 
are inherent in the processing of any murder 
case under Georgia law. He notes that the 
state pros~cutor has unfettered authority to 
select-those persons whoo he wishes to 
prn~ecute for a capital offense and to.plea 
bargain with them. Further, at the tr1al the 
jury may choose to convict a defendan~ of ~ 
lesser included offense rather than f1nd hlm 
guilty of a crime punishable by dea~h, even 
if the evidence would support a cap1tal 
verdict. l\nd finalJy, a defendant who is 
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convicted and sentenced to Cl ic rtay have hi 
sc;;i;encc' cOP1Pnd cc1 by lhec> Govccnor of the c;: te 
and the C2org i ,·, fl•Jard of' Paulons il nd Pa cu J c· 
The existence ·,li: t!1esc discretionary staqcs is 
no·t dete.cninative of the i::;suc•.,; before" us. l\t 
e0ch of the:>c s~·a<Jcs 0n actc. - in the crir1in. l 
justice sy~;· em I•t:J.kes o decit.ion which Play U"i<OVP 
a clcr•,'ncluni fro:o1 consideration as a canclidat:r for 
the death pPnalty. Furman, in contrast, c1e~lt with 
the decision to irnpo.coc the dc>c<th sentence 0·1 a 
snecific individual who h0d L~cn convicted o[ a 
c~oital offense. Nothlnq in any of our co~cs 
SligCJ ·~:: c; th:ct t,he c1ecic:icm to afford an iwl 'viclual 
d·tcndan~ mcrcv violates the Constitution. Furna~ 
held onlJ that,; in order to ninimizc the riskt!L,-;~ 
the death penalty coulcl be imposed on i1 cai,ri_ciously 
selr·ctced group of of fenders, thE' clecic; i,on tCI irt['' •.;c 
it hctd to be guider) by stancla1·ds so thc..t th • .sen "nclng 
authority would focus on thee particulaci.ZE'cl circuc;stoilCe' 
of the crime and the defendant.SO 
SO. The\ petitioner's arguf'lent is not·hincf mn:'c> tha;; 
a veiled cont2ntion that Furman indirectly c·~tl~~a0 
capital punishr1ent by placing totally unrca listie 
conditions on its use. In order to repair L~e alleged 
defects pointed to by the petitioner, il would bn 
nec<cssary to require that prosecuting authoriti0; 
charge a capital offense whenever arguably the1·c had 
been a capital murder and that they refuse to plea 
bargain with the defendant. If a jury refused to 
convict even though the evidence support-ed the charges, 
its verdict would have to he reversed and a verdict of 
guilty entered or a new trial ordered, ~ince the 
discretionary act of the jury nullification would not 
be pernitted. Finally, acts of executive clemency wou~ 
have to be prohibited. Such a systeM, of course, I·!CJlild 
be totally alien to our notions of crinti nal jus Lice. 
I·1orc:::>v~!:", it \·Ioul~1. be unconstit11tir)n;1l. Such a 
systerr~. ir;. ra:!~' resr~cts \-lould hA.vc the v j ccs of t-h2 
manC.iltor~· c'2ath pe:~·:tlt·r stat•Jtcs 1ve hold unconst~tutionc. 
today in l_:'_o_oc1s_c,-,~n \". t\orth Ci'lrolinu, post, u.:>. p. 
96 S. Ct. D .-2iJ-7~-1;1(f[:c~>bC>rts v. Lou ~siana, rc.st, 
___ u.s. p. __ , 96 s.c:. r-:- JOOl. Tlic--~:-u'JCJC·s-tC"jo that 
a jury's verdict of ocq.JittCll could bP overturn(,,: ,t:H1 a 
defccndrtnl: retried I!Oulcl run ·Foul of th(' Si):t!t 1\:•:··'l•l:~cn: 
jury-trial guarantr'e und tit Double ,Tcopanly Clause> of 
the Fifth lm:cw}rnc,nL. In the· federal sy~;l_em it aJc;o 
I·Jould be u::consl_itutional tr1 prohibit a Pr-c·siclcnl' froiTl 
dccidinc;, c1s an act of C't-:c'c:•:c.ivc clemenc-y, to rc>prjovc 
one sentE~nccc1 to death. u.s. Consl., J\r·l. 1I, § 2. 
428 U.S. at 153-154. 
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The opinions of the other Justices in the various cases 
cited above echo the reasoning of Mr. Justice Stewart. 
See also the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals legal analysis 
of the issue in Soinkellink, supra, at 578 F.2d 582, 606-609. 
While thB exact nature of appellant's claim of error 
in his petition is not clear from the face of it, Gregg, 
!'_r_o_ffitt, Jurek, \'loodson, ~oberts and SpinkellinY:, indicate 
that an attack o~ the discretion of the prosecutor in 
charging a capital felony is misdirected. Judge Sawaya v:as 
justified, therefore, according to the above cases, to 
reject appellant's prosecutorial discretion claim as a 
matter of law since it is an improper basis upon which to 
g,-ant appellant relief. The Supreme Court is clear in 
ils holding that discretion during the prosecution stetge of 
a criminal proceeding is proper and cannot be considered as 
a factor in the arbitrary appljcation argument in capital 
casccs. The balancing approach taken by the Supreme Court 
in this area deJT\onstrates its unwillingness to delve into 
th0 coJT\plex decisio~ process of prosecutors and therefore 
determined that such review is improper. Such a ruling is 
sounc1 and respondent urges this Court to adopt this position. 
Finally, respondent submits that the cases above 
c1jscussed--Gre'}9_, Jurek, Proffitl, etc.--have provided 
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state courts v1ith sufficient guidelines for tes t.i ncJ foJ-
urbitrarin<'~ . onJ discrii~tinat:ion in death penall.y Ci:l:;cc; sc> 
as to make rulings on this issue as a matter of luw possible. 
Moreover, it was not nc~essary for the United Stutes 
Supreme Court, ·Ln these cilses, t.o have f urthcr pc):; t--
conviction evicl·~ntiary hcarinc)s in order to reach 
decisions on tll,sc legal questions. rrhe Cou.ct' :; dc:r_;_i_sions 
1vere basec1 solely upon rcvie':l of ·the trial court onJ s '"' le 
appellate court records. 
this Court and the l01·1er coucl may proporl:' rcl;' onc1 accept 
prior rulings or1 those is sups as au t.hori ty for nc~;olution of 
the moLter. 1s no neac1 to relitigate the same claims. 
In any evenL, responc1ent contends that i1ppell<m t' s 
claims are most speculative. For example, in his brief, 
appellant contends that Judge Sawaya deniej hirn a chance to 
advance his evidentiary and authoritative theories o[ 
arbitrariness. He claims the conrt "hE"ard neit Iter this 
evidence nor legal argu~wnt fror•1 the petitioner," (app:'llant~s 
bric~ at 25). This sinply is not tru0. 
Appellant was given the opportunity to st0tc: to 
the lower courl what his claims of arbitrarines~ consi•.l·p~ 
of (Tr.l0-11). InsL~ad, appellant's counsel merely statec1 
that "we would hope to have an ezpecLi tions hear i It'J j 11 \·lllich 
-CJ(l-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1112 can establish thut claim in Utah Courts." (Tr.l3). 
Respondent contends, therefore, that inasmuch as 
concreto, specific claims of arbitrary and capricious 
application of the death penalty were not made readily 
apparent to the lower court, Judge Sawaya was justified 
in ruling, as a matter of law, that the claims lacked 
sufficient merit. Clearly, Judge Sawaya could do so since 
appellant's claim was soon to be most speculative. Appel-
lant should not he permitted to raise issues if he has 
insufficient facts upon which to base his cla~~s and does 
so only in an effort to be granted an additional forum "in 
which [appellant] can establish that claim. Respondent 
suggests that such claims are only attempts by appellant to 
delay and thwart his heretofor affirmed sentence. 
Finally, appellant contends throughout his brief that 
Judg9 Sawaya granted respondent's motion to dismiss without 
sufficient legal authority or basis. Yet, respondent referred 
Judge Sawaya to the legal arguments contained in the State's 
brief in opposition to certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court and the respondent's brief filed with this 
court in appellant's direct appeal following his co~viction 
(Tr.25,?G). Respondent's motion to dismiss, his 
supporting memo:anda and the attached above mentioned 
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briefs were all befor~ Judge Sawaya. 
justified in ruling on the merits as a matter of la~ 
and granting respondent's motion to dismiss. 
Respondent urges thi,: Court to find that 
appellant's clain or racial discriP:in0tion :in t;Jc, 
application of this .';tatc='s death penalty is foceclo;" 
by thEe Uni_ ted States Supreme Court '.ccisions, ~'j~_C\r 
and Spinkellink, supra, and is thccefore without r'lc'CL'::. 
Responden·t further urges this Court to n!lc that 
Judge Sawaya was therefore justified in granting 
respondent's motion to dismiss as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent submits th~t 
Judge Sawaya's order grantiny respondent's motion to disniss 
and denying appellant a stay of execution was sound based 
upon the application of this Court's waiver cloct•:i1v that 
issues which were or could have been raised on direct 
appeal may not subsc=quently be raised in a post-convlction 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Moreover, appellu.nt failed to raise any clcti"1 upo:1 
which relief could be gru.nted clue to the Vilguc and "Jl"culo-
tive nature of the claims, and the added fact that h~ na}· 
not benefit frorn a retJ oJctive> appJ ication of the JW\·7 
case law he relic,d UflO'l in support of his pr;tition. 
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Fin~llj, this Court should affir~ the lower court's 
rulin'] inz:tsm'.'''h as the Uti\ll de,:~th penalty statutes remain 
conc;titutionally sound in light of recent United States 
Supremo Court d~cisions, and should uphold the dismissal 
of appellant's claim of arbitrary and capricious application 
of the- death penalty inasmuch as it lacks legal merit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DOIUUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT R. \Il\LLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorn~:'s fo·:- Respondent 
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